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ARTICLE  
 
TERMINATING HOPE: DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN CASES OF POOR 
PRENATAL DIAGNOSES 
 
Andrew T. Bodoh* 
INTRODUCTION 
     In early 2015, I was blessed with the birth of a daughter who has severe 
special needs.1 I cherish the memories of her birthday. My wife had nearly 
eight months of motherhood already (my daughter was born five weeks 
early), but I experienced the joy of fatherhood as I sat with my first child in 
the NICU for several hours, as my wife rested. 
     We first learned of our daughter’s condition some fifteen weeks before, 
when the twenty-week ultrasound revealed cerebrospinal fluid occupying a 
large part of my daughter’s cranium, indicating a substantial, congenital 
brain malformation. My wife and I were referred to a children’s hospital 
where, after a long day, we met the attending physician, a resident, and a 
social worker in a small room to receive the prognosis. The prognosis was far, 
far worse than the reality I witnessed in the NICU less than four months later. 
We were told, for instance, that our daughter would likely require continual, 
institutional medical support if she survived the first days after birth. Instead, 
with the care and encouragement of several excellent medical providers,2 my 
daughter was discharged from the hospital within four days of her birth, 
without major interventions in the NICU. At four years old, she is nonverbal, 
nearly blind, and suffers from cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and a gross motor 
development delay, but she has not required prolonged institutionalization 
or in-home medical supervision. She loves music, going to school, and 
exploring the world with her hands and her tongue. 
     My wife and I declined the abortion offered to us in conjunction with the 
poor prenatal prognosis. As a litigation attorney, though, the experience 
made me wonder how the medicolegal system, including the risk of lawsuits 
																																																						
* Senior Associate of Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C., a Richmond, Virginia 
litigation  and civil rights firm. Graduate of Ave Maria School of Law in Naples, Florida (2010, 
JD) and Christendom College in Front Royal, Virginia (2007, BA). 
1.  Andrew T. Bodoh, Hope Has Become a Liability Risk in Cases of Poor Prenatal 
Diagnoses, SAVE THE 1 (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.savethe1.com/2017/02/03/hope-has-
become-a-liability-risk-in-cases-of-poor-prenatal-diagnoses-by-andrew-t-bodoh-esq/; 
Zoe Romanowsky, Little Girl Born with Rare Brain Disorder Defies Doctors Expectations, 
ALETEIA (Feb. 27, 2017), https://aleteia.org/2017/02/27/little-girl-born-with-rare-brain-
disorder-defies-doctors-expectations. 
2.  In particular, the author thanks doctors M.E., K.E., J.A., and nurse T.R. 
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alleging prenatal negligence, may influence a medical provider’s behavior in 
such instances. In particular, what factors may encourage a medical provider, 
when addressing an adverse fetal condition, or the risk of an adverse fetal 
condition, to present a worst-case scenario to the family, or to speak with 
greater confidence about future hardships for the child and the family than 
the scientific evidence supports, or otherwise to encourage the termination 
of the pregnancy? While I do not know if, or to what extent, particular 
medical providers (such as my wife’s) have been influenced by these factors, 
this Article identifies and studies those systematic incentives. 
     Put another way, this Article examines the reasons medical providers may 
practice defensive medicine by promoting elective abortions in response to 
adverse prenatal diagnoses.3 While many articles and cases have asserted a 
connection between the risk of lawsuits alleging prenatal negligence and the 
practice of defensive medicine in prenatal care, this Article examines the 
systemic connections in much greater detail within its narrow focus of 
adverse prenatal diagnoses.4 This Article considers, for instance, the 
																																																						
3.  This Article focuses on adverse prenatal diagnoses, rather than other prenatal or 
preconception scenarios, such as adverse preconception genetics screenings or counseling, 
failures to provide or recommend preconception genetics screenings or counseling, failures to 
diagnose or treat fetal conditions properly in utero, or ineffective sterilizations or abortions. 
While such scenarios are often discussed in connection with one another, each has distinct 
practical, medicolegal dynamics, and so this Article focuses on prenatal diagnoses specifically. 
4.  See, e.g., Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Iowa 2017) 
(accepting a wrongful birth claim and rejecting arguments about an increased risk of defensive 
medicine and more abortions); Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1152 (Md. 1993) (noting 
arguments of counsel that recognition of wrongful birth suits will cause overutilization of 
medical tests, affecting the standard of care); Albala v. New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 788 (N.Y. 
1981) (discussing the risk of physicians avoiding treatments that may cause birth defects in 
future pregnancies); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 818–19 (N.Y. 1978) (Wachtler, J., 
dissenting in part) (“A doctor exposed to liability of this magnitude will undoubtedly, in 
marginal cases, be inclined to practice ‘defensive medicine’ by advising abortion rather than 
run the risk of having to pay for the lifetime care of the child if it is born with a handicap. Thus 
the majority’s decision will involve human costs as well, in those cases where otherwise healthy 
children will be unnecessarily aborted as the only alternative to the threat of pecuniary 
liability.”); Paola Frati et al., Preimplantation and Prenatal Diagnosis, Wrongful Birth and 
Wrongful Life: A Global View of Bioethical and Legal Controversies, 23 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 
338, 347 (2017) (discussing English judicial opinions that oppose such causes of action based 
on concerns about defensive medicine, including abortion recommendations); Anthony 
Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful Pregnancy, and Wrongful Birth in the United 
States and England, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J 535, 554 (1995) (referencing “subconscious 
pressure to advise abortions in doubtful cases out of fear of actions for damages”); Michael A. 
Mogill, Misconceptions of the Law: Providing Full Recovery for the Birth of the Unplanned 
Child, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 827, 836 n.50 (referencing “unnecessary tests or operations”); 
Darpana M. Sheth, Better Off Unborn? An Analysis of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims 
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connections between adverse patient outcomes and the risk of informal 
punishments, the influence of post-viability or late-term abortion bans in 
such cases, and the inherent challenges facing a provider in addressing an 
adverse prenatal diagnosis with a family.5 
     Adverse prenatal diagnoses are difficult for all involved, and this Article 
tries to be fair to providers and patients alike. My experiences6 and opinion, 
however, undoubtedly shape the language I choose and the arguments I 
advance. I support a broader legal recognition of fetal rights than the status 
quo, and I have sympathies with the social model of disability, which 
emphasizes the role social assumptions play in the limitations experienced by 
those with medical or mental health conditions.7 To illustrate, when a 
wheelchair-bound person encounters a stairway, the social model of 
disability recognizes that the medical condition does not alone limit the 
person’s access to the next floor; rather, the stairway itself and the implicit 
assumption that people can climb stairs also cause the limitation the person 
experiences.8 
     Part I of this Article examines generally the medicolegal context that gives 
rise to the so-called practice of defensive medicine. It argues that providers 
																																																						
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 73 TENN. L. REV. 641, 665 (2006) (referencing the 
use of excessive medical testing); Paula Bernstein, Comment, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round 
Hole: Why Traditional Tort Principles Do Not Apply to Wrongful Birth Actions, 18 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 297, 319 & n.139 (2001) (discussing the likelihood of excessive testing); 
Carolyn Lee Brown, Editorial Note, Genetic Malpractice: Avoiding Liability, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 
857, 880 (1986) (referencing overuse or avoidance of prenatal diagnostics); Matthew Diehr, 
Comment, The State of Affairs Regarding Counseling for Expectant Parents of a Child with a 
Disability: Do ACOG’s New Practice Guidelines Signify the Arrival of a Brave New World?, 53 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1287, 1301–02 (2009) (referencing the ACOG’s recommendations that all 
pregnant women undergo prenatal Down syndrome screening, and suggesting such practices 
“may place excessive pressure on women to have an abortion”); Bernadette Kennedy, 
Comment, The Trend Toward Judicial Recognition of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 473, 500 (1983) (referencing the risk of “overdeterrence of potential birth 
defects” through physicians recommending abortion “where the mother is at even a slight 
risk” for birthing a child with special needs); W. Ryan Schuster, Note, Rights Gone Wrong: A 
Case Against Wrongful Life, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2329, 2348 (2016) (referencing both the 
risk of excessive prenatal screening and of incentivizing the physicians to recommend 
abortion); see also, e.g., Thomas Keasler Foutz, Comment, “Wrongful Life”: The Right Not To 
Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 493 n.82 (1980) (arguing that to avoid suits, physicians must 
merely obtain informed consent). 
5.  See infra Parts I and II. 
6.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
7.  Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 
40 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. Rev. 141, 147–49 (2005). This social model is typically described as a 
competitor of the more traditional medical model of disability, in which the limitations are 
viewed as arising simply or predominantly from the medical condition. Id. at 146–47. 
8.  Id. at 148. 
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wish to avoid formal and informal punishments that stem from disciplinary, 
civil, and criminal processes, and this means avoiding adverse patient 
outcomes. Part II then examines the risks associated with poor prenatal 
diagnoses specifically, including the risk of lawsuits alleging prenatal 
negligence, and the practical difficulties medical providers face in addressing 
fetal anomalies. Part III examines an extraordinary case from Connecticut, 
Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, in which a couple sued two physicians for 
recommending an abortion based on an erroneous prenatal diagnosis. This 
case illustrates many of the concerns identified in this Article. Part IV argues 
that the current arrangement has social and moral costs. Part V then surveys 
the pros and cons of several options for improving the situation. 
I. THE MEDICOLEGAL CONTEXT 
     To understand why a medical provider may try to terminate a parent’s 
hope for a child in utero in response to prenatal evidence of an adverse fetal 
condition, one should explore the broader context, assessing the medicolegal 
system at a much more general level and approaching the problem 
incrementally. The first section of this Part provides a general framework for 
understanding defensive medicine, and the second section looks more 
specifically at medical malpractice lawsuits within this framework. Part II 
then looks at defensive medicine in the context of poor prenatal diagnoses. 
A.  From Patient Autonomy to Defensive Medicine 
     Today, our society expects every competent patient to cooperate, and to 
be allowed to cooperate, in decisions pertaining to his or her medical care.9 
Indeed, the patient is typically considered the final decision-maker in most 
matters concerning medical treatment.10 As the American Medical 
																																																						
9.  See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS §§ 1.1.3–1.1.4 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf; 
Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims 
Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973, 982 (2009) (describing informed consent as “one of the 
fundamental building blocks of the modern physician-patient relationship”); id. at 984 
(describing the “building blocks of bioethics” as including an “emphasis on individual rights 
[and] the primacy of autonomy”).  
10.  CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS §§ 1.1.3–1.1.4 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf; 
Johnson, supra note 9, at 982, 984; Kristen Ann Curran, Comment, Informed Consent: A Right 
Without a Remedy Examined Through the Lens of Maternity Care, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 133, 138 n.25 (2012); Darrin P. Dixon, Informed Consent or Institutionalized 
Eugenics? How the Medical Profession Encourages Abortion of Fetuses with Down Syndrome, 
24 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 46 (2008) (“Twenty-years ago doctors were the sole medical decision-
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Association’s Code of Ethics states, “Autonomous, competent patients 
control the decisions that direct their health care.”11 This ideal, however, is 
undermined by the complexities of modern medicine. The practice of 
medicine requires expertise. Even apart from the skills required, for instance, 
to perform surgery or to use specialized medical equipment, patients often 
do not have the capacity or the know-how to collect and to digest the 
information necessary to make timely, informed healthcare decisions 
without the counsel of medical professionals.12 
     The divide between the ideal of patient autonomy and the need for expert 
care challenges the medicolegal system, and our society has adopted the 
approach of cautious trust in medical professionals.13 With respect to trust, 
we as individuals, and collectively as a society, allow medical professionals to 
guide us in life and death decisions, often with the mantra that the doctor 
knows best.14 We expect medical professionals to have answers to our 
questions about what we are experiencing, what is causing it, and what will 
cure it. We also allow medical providers fairly broad discretion in their 
professional sphere.15 At the same time, we act with caution. We impose 
training and testing on those attempting to enter the profession to determine 
if they are worthy of our trust.16 We also regulate, for instance, what drugs 
																																																						
makers and now much emphasis has been placed on patient autonomy and self-determination 
within the medical context.”). 
11.  CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 1.1.4 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf. 
12.  See generally Timothy E. Quill & Howard Brody, Physician Recommendations and 
Patient Autonomy: Finding a Balance Between Physician Power and Patient Choice, 125 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 763 (1996). 
13.  Cf. Johnson, supra note 9, at 978 n.27 (“Trust has assumed a central position in 
discussions of efforts to regulate physician behavior. Most of the literature addressing the 
difficult issue of the extent to which society, and patients in particular, generally trusts 
physicians, explains patterns in the regulation of medical practice or can be used as a guide for 
choices in regulatory form”); Quill & Brody, supra note 12 (discussing the need to balance the 
patients’ autonomy and the physicians’ expertise). 
14.  Cf. Katherine Say, Note, Wrongful Birth – Preserving Justice for Women and Their 
Families, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 251, 284 (2003) (“Real danger lies . . . in physicians’ 
misperception that their patients rely on the practitioner to make decisions for them. Society 
has long conferred on physicians the extraordinary power they presume. This power manifests 
itself in the control of information flow, to the detriment of informed prenatal decision-
making. In addition, a physician’s advice may be colored by personal political or moral beliefs, 
destroying the ideal of judgment-neutral information exchange.”). 
15.  Id. 
16.  See DAVID A. JOHNSON & HUMAYUN J. CHAUDHRY, MEDICAL LICENSING AND DISCIPLINE 
IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE FEDERATION STATE MEDICAL BOARDS 1–2 (2012) (summarizing 
the training and licensure requirements but noting “the system is not foolproof, judging by 
6 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:1 
	
reach the market, what medical claims the drug manufacturers may make in 
the marketplace, and who has the power to prescribe and dispense such 
drugs.17  
     We also allow medical professionals to be held accountable for breaches 
of trust through formal professional discipline, civil liability, and even 
criminal sanctions.18 In theory, the medicolegal system administers formal 
disciplinary, civil, and criminal sanctions for breaches of established medical, 
legal, and ethical standards, with the protections of due process, in order to 
discourage, remedy, and punish such breaches.19 In practice, however, 
medical providers experience informal punishments or adverse 
consequences before, during, and after such proceedings.20 Informal 
punishments include, for instance, inconvenience, distress, personal or 
professional humiliation, financial costs, legal fees, temporary suspension or 
loss of medical privileges, administrative leave, and loss of employment.21 
While in theory medical providers have nothing to fear if they comply with 
medical, legal, and ethical standards, as the process will protect the innocent 
																																																						
the caseloads of today’s state medical board investigators and the more than 6,000 substantive 
disciplinary actions . . . taken annually against physicians”). 
17.  See Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/110437/download (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). 
18.  See generally Kara M. McCarthy, Note, Doing Time for Clinical Crime: The Prosecution 
of Incompetent Physicians as an Additional Mechanism To Assure Quality Health Care, 28 
SETON HALL L. REV. 569 (1997) (discussing the various methods of disciplining physicians for 
errors in medical practice). 
19.  See id. 
20.  See Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation as a 
Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 48 (2011) (indicating that physicians “are no longer able 
to pass increased malpractice premiums on to their patients or insurers”); Johnson, supra note 
9, at 978 (“There is a rather substantial body of research . . . that identifies apparently unique 
experiences, motivations, and reactions on the part of physicians. Research examining the 
training of physicians, for example, reveals heightened sensitivity to shame associated with 
errors . . . . In addition, significant distrust on the part of physicians toward the legal system 
may influence them to react differently to legal risks and incentives as compared to other risks 
and incentives.”); id. at 1029 (“The costs [to physicians] of the inquiry or investigation include 
financial costs, disruption of the practice, damage to reputation, resultant ostracism or 
termination of necessary business relationships, stress, shame, and other losses that are quite 
significant.”); McCarthy, supra note 18. 
21.  Furrow, supra note 20, at 48; Johnson, supra note 9, at 978, 1029; Haavi Morreim, 
Malpractice, Mediation, and Moral Hazard: The Virtues of Dodging the Data Bank, 27 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 109, 115–116 (2012). 
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from formal sanctions,22 informal punishments arising from the process fall 
on the innocent as well as the guilty, and there is also the risk of erroneous 
judgments.23 Medical providers, therefore, may reasonably try to reduce the 
risk of formal and informal punishments, rather than simply avoiding the 
behaviors that are legitimately the target of formal punishments. This means, 
in practice, physicians should try to avoid unexpectedly severe adverse 
patient outcomes. 
     A bad patient outcome—that is, any outcome perceived to be both 
unexpected and adverse by the patient, the patient’s family, or others—
increases the risk of formal or informal punishments in several ways. First, 
an adverse patient outcome may cause someone to initiate formal 
proceedings.24 The poor outcome may motivate the patient or the patient’s 
family to file a civil, criminal, or disciplinary complaint against the medical 
provider. Similarly, an adverse outcome may influence those who witnessed 
actual or suspected provider misconduct to report it. A severe adverse patient 
outcome might also trigger an automatic investigation under established 
institutional policies. Second, a patient’s outcome may be a factor in 
determining the time and resources dedicated to the formal investigation, as 
part of a civil, criminal, or disciplinary process. This is often a matter of 
resource allocation—using limited resources on matters deemed the most 
important—but other factors, such as legal strategy, may contribute to this. 
For instance, a medical practice may limit its internal investigation of a 
simple medical error because the information it uncovers may be used 
against the organization in a civil suit.25 A severely adverse patient outcome, 
however, may compel the practice to investigate in depth. Third, an adverse 
outcome may tip the balance to a finding of wrongdoing. For instance, the 
																																																						
22.  See, e.g., Foutz, supra note 4, at 492 n.82 (critiquing concerns about a link between 
lawsuits and defensive medicine by arguing that to avoid suits, physicians must merely obtain 
informed consent). 
23.  Michael D. Benson et al., Hospital Quality Improvement: Are Peer Review Immunity, 
Privilege, and Confidentiality in the Public Interest?, 11 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 2, 8–11 (2016); 
David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2027–28 (2006); Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault 
Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908, 926–27 (1993). 
24.  See Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families To File Medical 
Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1359, 1359 (1992); 
Wendy Levinson, Doctor-Patient Communications and Medical Malpractice: Implications for 
Pediatricians, 26 PEDIATRIC ANNALS 186 (1997). 
25.  Cf. Margo Schlanger, Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 517, 
517–18, 532 (2006) (discussing the “suppression of information-production for fear of 
resulting litigation”). 
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outcome may color the evaluation of the evidence.26 Similarly, scapegoating 
is a possibility—blaming the provider for the bad outcome for the sake of 
public perception or to shift attention away from other blameworthy people, 
institutions, or practices.27 Fourth, the bad patient outcome may be a factor 
in evaluating the formal sanctions administered, whether legitimately or 
illegitimately.  
     Medical providers may overestimate the personal and professional risks of 
bad patient outcomes.28 Day-to-day experiences—such as periodic 
malpractice insurance payments or the stories from colleagues and 
instructors—may affect a provider’s evaluation of the risks, making the 
provider unduly wary of adverse proceedings.29 The American Medical 
Association (“AMA”), advocating for tort reform, highlights the concerns 
this way: 
     Because being sued is such a common event over the 
course of a physician’s career, and because medical liability 
insurance is so costly, the fear of liability hangs like a cloud 
over physicians—and it never goes away. The liability 
environment influences how physicians practice and affects 
patients’ access to care and treatment.30  
     The risks associated with adverse patient outcomes may motivate 
providers to avoid these outcomes though objectionable practices. A 
provider may, for instance, recommend or undertake tests or procedures that 
involve risks, costs, or patient suffering disproportionate to the anticipated 
medical benefit, to avoid a small or remote risk of an adverse patient 
																																																						
26.  See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 203–04 (2011) (discussing 
outcome bias—the tendency in hindsight to blame decision-makers for not avoiding a bad 
outcome). 
27.  See Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health Care Reform: Managing Care and 
Managing Risk, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 79, 94–95 (1994) (noting that medical malpractice cases 
focus on physician mistakes rather than other causes of poor healthcare).   
28.  See Katharine Van Tassel, Harmonizing the Affordable Care Act with the Three Main 
National Systems for Healthcare Quality Improvement: The Tort, Licensure, and Hospital Peer 
Review Hearing Systems, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 883, 912 n.138 (2013). 
29.  Cf. Jodi Halpern & Robert M. Arnold, Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized 
Challenge in Making Serious Health Decisions, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1708, 1710 (2008) 
(“[S]tudies show that physicians’ specific professional biases may lessen their ability to see 
patients’ situations clearly, for example, when they are overly influenced by the memory of a 
rare bad outcome.”). 
30.  AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM NOW! 2 (2018 ed.), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/premium/arc/mlr-now.pdf. 
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outcome.31 The provider may inflate the adverse prognosis or diagnosis, or 
overstate the risks of the condition to the patient, or pretend a test or practice 
is routine, in order to justify a course of care the patient might otherwise 
reasonably reject, or to otherwise influence the patient’s expectations and 
mitigate the patient’s surprise if an adverse outcome occurs.32 The provider 
may also refer, transfer, or decline to care for patients with a heighted risk of 
an adverse outcome.33 A provider might try to hide a bad outcome, obscure 
its cause, or make the case more difficult to prove for the potential claimant 
and easier to defend for the provider.34 The provider may substitute a more 
active course of care for a more passive one to impress the patient that what 
can be done is being done.35 A provider may make treatment decisions 
intended to minimize the risk or type of formal or informal punishments if 
an adverse outcome is probable or unavoidable.36 Using these practices, 
whereby the best medical care and judgment is subordinated to efforts to 
mitigate the provider’s professional or legal risks, is typically called the 
practice of defensive medicine.37  
     In short, defensive medicine is not simply the fault of medical providers 
or the medical establishment. It is, in part, a byproduct of a system that 
subjects medical providers to formal or informal punishments that correlate 
too strongly with adverse patient outcomes rather than actual provider 
misconduct. With this overview in mind, the next section specifically 
explores the role of civil malpractice lawsuits in the medicolegal system and 
how these suits motivate the practice of defensive medicine. 
																																																						
31.  See Isaac D. Buck, Overtreatment and Informed Consent: A Fraud-Based Solution to 
Unwanted and Unnecessary Care, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 901, 910–13 (2016) (discussing the 
provision of unnecessary treatment); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive 
Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 65 (2006); Schlanger, supra 
note 25, at 517–18, 524–25; David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk 
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2609, 2612–
13 (2005); Mark Strasser, Yes, Virginia, There Can Be Wrongful Life: On Consistency, Public 
Policy, and the Birth-Related Torts, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 821, 833 (2003); AM. MED. ASS’N, 
supra note 30, at 5. 
32.  Cf. Schlanger, supra note 25, at 517 (“[P]otential litigation can induce potential 
defendants to favor more cognizable or demonstrable care, and less cognizable or 
demonstrable harm.”). 
33.  Id. at 534. 
34.  Id. at 517–18, 525, 532–33.  
35.  See Levinson, supra note 24 (discussing how perceptions of poor communication and 
inadequate attention promote dissatisfaction and motivate litigation). 
36.  See generally Schlanger, supra note 25. 
37.  E.g., Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 2609. 
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B.  Civil Lawsuits and Defensive Medicine 
     In regulating the practice of medicine, our medicolegal system allows 
patients injured by a medical professional to sue for damages, awarded as a 
monetary sum. In theory, civil lawsuits against medical providers serve 
several functions. They shift the cost of the harm from the patient and social 
welfare programs to those responsible for causing the harm and to insurers 
of the wrongdoers.38 Such suits are presumed to deter the bad behavior of 
medical professionals.39 Such suits may also award exemplary and punitive 
damages.40 Litigation also typically permits a judgment on a more complete 
and accurate record than other dispute resolution methods.41 In general, 
these suits are intended to support the system of cautious trust in medical 
professionals.42  
     The type of civil claim most relevant to this article is negligence.43 
Negligence claims allege that some action or inaction of the medical provider 
breached the applicable standard of reasonably prudent medical care. More 
specifically, the plaintiff must show (1) a duty recognized in the common law, 
such as the duty to act as a reasonably prudent medical provider would have 
acted under the circumstances, a norm called the “standard of care,” (2) a 
breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) the causal relationship between the 
breach and the injury.44   
     Notably, there must be both a demonstrable breach of the duty and 
demonstrable damages caused by that breach, so a doctor will escape civil 
liability if there are no provable damages, even if the doctor was negligent. 
Conversely, causing an injury alone does not create liability when the 
provider’s conduct was within the standard of care.45 Notably, too, as 
																																																						
38.  See Hensel, supra note 7, at 171; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1301. 
39.  Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil Recourse Theory Is Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. REV. 
431 (2011); Diehr, supra note 4, at 1301; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 491–92. 
40.  See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 489–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1980). 
41.  Florence Yee, Note, Mandatory Mediation: The Extra Dose Needed To Cure the 
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 393, 406–07 (2006). 
42.  See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 31, at 65. 
43.  See generally Jackson, supra note 4 (discussing the various classes of negligence actions 
that may arise due to prenatal negligence). 
44.  See generally Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the 
Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 205–248 (1993); Bernstein, supra note 4, at 
302–03; Brown, supra note 4, at 861–64; Say, supra note 14, at 264–65; Foutz, supra note 4, at 
488; Jackson, supra note 4; Sheth, supra note 4, at 645–648; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 482–90. 
45.  See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 31, at 66. The asymmetry created by this rule—
namely that different medical providers committing substantially the same negligent act may 
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impressive as “the standard of care” sounds, it is often little more than 
whatever a paid expert witness persuades the judge or jury to believe it is.46 
After all, this legal standard is intended to be flexible.47 It is not intended to 
restrict the evolution of medical practice or to dictate checklist-style care 
when a case-by-case approach is more appropriate. It is therefore for the 
judge or jury to determine what the standard requires and whether the 
standard was breached after the presentation of expert opinions and 
evidence.48 
     The risk of civil lawsuits for negligence tends to influence medical 
professionals because of the formal and informal punishments associated 
with such suits.49 First, a civil suit is typically a permanent, public allegation 
of misconduct.50 A civil suit is normally public from the moment the case is 
filed with the court. Medical providers have obvious personal and 
professional reasons to avoid public allegations of misconduct. By contrast, 
many forms of employment or professional discipline are substantially 
private, at least until there is a finding of misconduct.51 Second, lawsuits take 
an emotional toll on the defendant.52 The process is adversarial, with parties 
seeking to gain an advantage through tactics that obscure the merits of the 
case. An almost random jury of laypeople may decide the merits of the 
medical care provided. The provider will face inquiries from his or her 
employer, attorney, and insurer, to say nothing of the opposing counsel or 
party. Facing the adverse consequences of a past decision, whether the 
decision was right or wrong, will also be emotionally troubling, especially in 
																																																						
experience dramatically different consequences based on the outcome of the act—is often 
discussed in academic literature under the term “moral luck.” E.g. Justin W. Martin and Fiery 
Cushman, The Adaptive Logic of Moral Luck, in JUSTIN SYTSMA & WESLEY BUCKWALTER, EDS., 
A COMPANION TO EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 190 (2016); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipuraky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007); Morris B. Hoffman, Ten 
Legal Dissonances, 62 MERCER L. REV. 989, 1007–09 (2011).   
46.  See Belsky, supra note 44, at 245; Adam Candeub, Contract, Warranty, and the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 71–72 (2011); Christopher 
Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 177–78, 184–88 (2010); Yee, supra 
note 41, at 408–09. 
47.  E.g., Smethers v. Campion, 108 P.3d 946, 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
48.  E.g. id. at 949–50. 
49.  Dixon, supra note 10, at 50–53; Havighurst & Richman, supra note 31, at 65 
(“[M]alpractice claims also impose substantial reputational and emotional costs on 
physicians.”); Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 2612.  
50.  See Weiler, supra note 23, at 943. 
51.  See, e.g., Benson et al., supra note 23 (discussing the privacy protections afforded to 
hospital peer review processes). 
52.  Johnson, supra note 9, at 978, 1000–02, 1029. 
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connection with a lawsuit. Third, there is often a risk of direct or indirect 
financial loss, such as the obligation to pay an insurance deductible, all or a 
portion of the judgment or settlement, attorney fees, or increased insurance 
premiums.53 Finally, the provider will need to disclose and to explain the 
circumstances of the lawsuit in the future.54  
     Most of the risks associated with lawsuits, unfortunately, are more closely 
connected to the fact of the litigation or the process itself, rather than a 
finding of misconduct by a judge or jury. Most of these harms fall on the 
provider that is wrongly sued as well as the one that is justly sued. The risk of 
being sued, in turn, is more strongly associated with bad patient outcomes 
than with bad behavior of the medical professional.55 Several factors deter 
claims—even meritorious claims—from being brought when there is no 
severe, adverse patient outcome, and increase the likelihood of a lawsuit 
when after a severe, adverse patient outcome, even if there was no negligence. 
     To understand these factors, we must look at the situation in detail from 
the perspective of the claimant and the claimant’s attorney. No medical 
malpractice suit exists without a claimant—typically someone who has 
suffered a bad outcome and believes the medical provider is to blame, or the 
patient’s legal representative. In cases involving prenatal fetal anomalies, the 
claimant will be the child with special needs or the family of that child. 
Because malpractice litigation is complicated, the claimant normally needs 
an attorney. To get an attorney, the claimant must persuade an attorney to 
accept the case, and the claimant and the attorney must broker an acceptable 
fee arrangement.  
     In deciding whether to represent a claimant in a medical malpractice suit, 
and on what terms, the attorney will usually perform a rough, and often 
intuitive, evaluation of the case.56 The attorney’s initial calculus can be 
summarized most simply as follows: 
																																																						
53.  See id. at 1029; Medical Malpractice Insurance Complete Guide, CUNNINGHAM GROUP, 
https://www.cunninghamgroupins.com/medical-malpractice-insurance-complete-guide/ 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2019); Matt Thompson, 5 Primary Factors that Affect a Physicians 
Malpractice Insurance Premium, DIEDERICH HEALTHCARE (Feb. 23, 2016),  
https://www.diederichhealthcare.com/the-standard/5-primary-factors-that-affect-a-
physicians-malpractice-insurance-premium/. 
54.  CUNNINGHAM GROUP, supra note 53; Thompson, supra note 53. See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 
60.1–.22 (2004) (regulating mandatory reports to the National Practitioners Database, and 
access to this information). 
55.  See Johnson, supra note 9, at 992, 999–1000; Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 2029–
31. 
56.  See Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 384 (2009). 
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     (A) Probability of obtaining a recovery  
 x  (B) Probable recovery if successful 
     (C) Gross value of the case 
 –  (D) Probable cost and fees  
     (E) Probable net value to client57 
In a complex and labor-intensive case like a medical malpractice suit, the 
attorney will typically want a substantial fee (see line D). A claimant usually 
cannot afford to pay an hourly fee, as medical malpractice cases are time 
intensive. The attorney, on the other hand, generally will not accept the case 
on a contingency fee basis unless the gross value of the case (line C) is high, 
because the fee will be a percentage of the recovery, if any.58 Considering also 
the high costs of medical experts for malpractice litigation (a factor in line 
D), the case must have a high gross value (line C) to offset the probable costs 
and fees (line D) and produce a net value to the client (line E).  
     The attorney’s representation, therefore, typically depends on the 
estimated gross value of the case (line C). The gross value of the case, in turn, 
equals the probability of obtaining a recovery (line A) multiplied by the 
probable recovery (line B). In medical malpractice claims, the probable 
recovery (line B) dominates this calculation. The claimant typically can 
supply enough information for the attorney to have a rough but reliable idea 
of whether the recovery could be substantial (line B). In fact, the material 
issue is simply whether the patient’s outcome was adverse and severe. A 
severe outcome generally equates to a large recovery, if successful, and a less 
severe outcome generally equates to a smaller potential recovery (line B). By 
contrast, the likelihood of winning the case (line A) is often impossible to 
evaluate reliably at the outset of the representation. First, the attorney often 
will not know with a high degree of confidence the appropriate medical care 
in the specific circumstance, or whether the adverse outcome might be 
attributed to some independent cause. These facts are essential to evaluating 
the likelihood of prevailing on the claim (line A).59 Second, at the outset of 
the case, the attorney often does not have enough information to know what 
actually happened to produce the outcome, much less what the testimony will 
be at trial. Medical records, for instance, usually tell more about the severity 
																																																						
57.  For more complicated methods of calculating this, see Thomas H. Belknap, 
Calculating Settlement Value of a Case, MAR. REPORTER & ENG’G NEWS (Apr. 2014), https:// 
www.blankrome.com/sites/default/files/86063803942C25C141FAC6C2A1F39546.pdf; Peter  
Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 
(1991). 
58.  Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 
377 (2014); Molot, supra note 56, at 384. 
59.  Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 2029–31. 
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of the outcome than about who, if anyone, or what, if anything, is responsible 
for the bad outcome. The claimant’s narrative of events will also be unreliable 
to some greater or lesser degree. A patient, for instance, will not have personal 
knowledge of many aspects of the course of care, such as what happened 
while under general anesthesia. Moreover, the emotional trauma of the 
experience often colors the claimant’s memories of the events, making the 
medical professionals appear more blameworthy in the claimant’s recounting 
than the facts may justify.60 Attorneys know the same is true in reverse for the 
medical professionals, creating disputes of fact. Disputes about the facts, 
then, are reasonably expected and do not necessarily represent malicious lies 
or bad faith. Rather, they are often the natural and predictable result of 
imperfect human memory in emotionally stressful circumstances. This 
creates, however, great uncertainty in the probability of winning the case 
(line A). 
     As a business matter, a medical malpractice attorney must be cautious of 
overestimating the value of the case at the outset (line C), especially if the 
attorney is offering a contingency fee. As such, given the typical high degree 
of uncertainty in the prospects of winning a medical malpractice case (line 
A), the attorney usually will be extremely cautious to take a case unless the 
probable recovery if successful (line B) is sufficiently high to offset the risk 
and uncertainty. Put another way, the attorney will not take the case unless 
the patient suffered a severe, adverse outcome. If the outcome is bad enough, 
even a small chance at a substantial fee may be worth the risk to the attorney. 
Therefore, the severity of the patient’s outcome roughly correlates to the 
likelihood that an attorney will accept the representation on workable terms 
and initiate a lawsuit against the provider. The attorney often will not know 
if the provider was, in fact, negligent at the outset of the case. 
     Note, too, a claimant may be more willing to accept high fees and costs for 
a lawsuit (line D), as well as a prospect of little or no recovery (line E), if the 
experience was so severe that the claimant has a goal other than a financial 
recovery, such as justice, the desire to punish the provider, the desire to 
prevent this outcome for others in the future, or the opportunity to speak out 
against the provider or the medical system. This is one way a severe patient 
outcome may increase the resources spent to investigate and to prosecute a 
																																																						
60.  Cf. Dixon, supra note 10, at 45–47; Deborah Davis & William C. Follette, Foibles of 
Witness Memory for Traumatic/High Profile Events, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1421, 1454–67 
(discussing how trauma and stress impair memory in several ways); Deborah Davis, Markus 
Kemmelmeier, & William C. Follette, Memory for Conversation on Trial, in HANDBOOK OF 
HUMAN FACTORS IN LITIGATION 12–4, 12–5 (Y. Ian Noy & Waldemar Karwowski eds., 2004); 
KAHNEMAN, supra note 26, at 203–04 (discussing outcome bias—the tendency in hindsight to 
blame decision-makers for not avoiding a bad outcome). 
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complaint against the provider, increasing the risks associated with an 
adverse patient outcome. 
     Given these factors, one could reasonably predict three results. First, many 
meritorious malpractice claims are never brought, because the estimated 
gross value of the claims (line C) are estimated to be too small relative to the 
expected costs and fees (line D). Second, the claims that are brought tend to 
have high recoveries when they are successful (see lines B and C). Third, a 
large fraction of the claims that are brought are unsuccessful, because the 
probability of winning the case (line A) is so uncertain at the outset. The 
available data conform to these predictions. The majority of patients who 
suffer a medical injury due to a provider’s negligence do not sue.61 One study 
found that for every malpractice claim brought, there were 7.6 incidents of 
medical negligence causing adverse outcomes.62 Likewise, claimants often fail 
to obtain a recovery, but a successful claim typically brings a substantial 
recovery. One broad study of the malpractice claims from 1991 to 2005 
showed that 78% of the claims that were initiated did not result in a payment 
to the claimant, but the mean indemnity payment in successful claims was 
$274,887.63 Another later study, using data through 2015, showed again that 
only about a quarter of the claims resulted in an indemnity payment, but the 
average payment in successful claims was $365,503.64 While one-third of the 
indemnity payments between 2006 and 2015 were less than $100,000, 
payments exceeding one million dollars accounted for 41.9% of the total of 
the indemnity payments.65 The average trial award for successful claims 
closed in 2015 was $1,121,815, though trial awards accounted for only 3.5% 
of the total amount of indemnity payments.66 Additionally, claims that do not 
involve a medical error are more likely to go to trial due to lack of settlement 
than claims that do involve a medical error, though meritless claims rarely 
result in a verdict for the claimant.67 
																																																						
61.  Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 2025. 
62.  A. Russel Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due 
to Negligence—Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245 
(1991). 
63.  Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 629, 629 (2011). 
64.  Jose R. Guardado, Medical Professional Liability Insurance Indemnity Payments, 
Expenses and Claim Disposition, 2006–2015, AM. MED. ASS’N POL’Y RES. PERSP., at 2–3 (2018), 
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/government/ 
advocacy/policy-research-perspective-liability-insurance-claim.pdf. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Studdert et al., supra note 23, at 2028. 
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     Returning to the theme of defensive medicine, providers respond to this 
risk of lawsuits and to high malpractice insurance premiums by practicing 
defensive medicine. For instance, a 2017 survey of 601 primary care providers 
and specialists found that 86% of them believed that the fear of malpractice 
was a reason for ordering unnecessary tests or procedures.68 Concerns about 
liability may also influence the education of medical students and young 
providers, perpetuating and institutionalizing inappropriate medical 
practices.69  
     In short, while malpractice litigation is intended to compensate victims of 
medical negligence, providers reasonably wish to avoid such suits, whether 
the claims are ultimately successful or not. A substantial adverse patient 
outcome creates the risk of a malpractice claim, regardless of the provider’s 
responsibility. Providers therefore try to avoid adverse outcomes through the 
practice of defensive medicine. 
II. DEFENSIVE MEDICINE IN CASES OF POOR PRENATAL DIAGNOSES 
     Part I of this Article examines defensive medicine generally in its social 
context. This Part of the Article looks more closely at defensive medicine in 
the context of poor prenatal diagnoses. It argues that specific social, scientific, 
legal, and ethical difficulties attending poor prenatal diagnoses give providers 
reasons to go beyond discussing terminating the pregnancy, and to actively 
encourage the woman to do so.70 
A.  Defensive Medicine in Obstetric Care 
     Obstetricians and gynecologists are generally recognized as having the 
highest rate of malpractice claims among medical specialists.71 While only a 
small fraction of this is likely tied to poor prenatal diagnoses, the general 
concern about liability can contribute to a culture of defensive medicine in 
																																																						
68.  Choosing Wisely, DataBrief: Findings from a National Survey of Physicians, AM. 
BOARD INTERNAL MED. FOUND. 1, 5–6 (2017), http://www.choosingwisely.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Summary-Research-Report-Survey-2017.pdf. 
69.  Alexius Cruz O’Malley, Preventing a Return to Twilight and Straightjackets: Using the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as a Starting Point for Evidence-Based Obstetric 
Reform in the United States, 8 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 295, 315–16 (2013). 
70.  See Buck, supra note 31, at 923 (noting that providers may not discuss alternatives 
when they consider the risks or benefits not worth discussing or when they strongly support a 
particular treatment option). 
71.  Jose R. Guardado, Medical Liability Claim Frequency Among U.S. Physicians, AM. 
MED. ASS’N POL’Y RES. PERSP. 1, 8 (2017), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/ 
corp/media-browser/public/government/advocacy/policy-research-perspective-medical-
liability-claim-frequency.pdf. 
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prenatal care. In a 2015 survey, nearly three-quarters (73.6%) of the 
responding OB-GYNs reported that they had been sued.72 Each OB-GYN 
who responded had experienced, on average, 2.59 claims.73 Approximately 
forty percent of the claims with a result reported in the survey responses 
involved payments on behalf of the medical provider, averaging nearly one-
half million dollars, with the average payment for a neurologically impaired 
infant exceeding $1,000,000.74 Nearly half (49.7%) of the OB-GYNs 
acknowledged they had altered their practices between 2012 and 2014 out of 
fear of liability, including 23.8% who decreased the number of high-risk 
obstetrics patients they accepted.75 Nearly forty percent (39.8%) claimed they 
made adjustments to their practices between 2012 and 2014 based on the 
affordability or the availability of liability insurance, including 13.6% that 
decreased the number of high-risk obstetrics patients they accepted.76 
Meanwhile, the cost of malpractice premiums for OB-GYNs vary widely.77 In 
2014, these costs tended to exceed $100,000 annually in twelve states, with a 
peak of $214,999 a year in New York.78 Survey data from 2015 indicate OB-
GYNs spent an incredible average of 10.6% of their gross income on liability 
insurance premiums.79 In another study, reviewing data from 1991 to 2005, 
obstetrics and gynecology accounted for eleven of the sixty-six awards in 
excess of one million dollars that the study identified, more than any other 
specialty.80 Another study found that malpractice claims against OB-GYNs 
																																																						
72.  Andrea M. Carpentieri et al., Overview of the 2015 American Congress of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists’ Survey on Professional Liability 3, AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND 
GYNECOLOGISTS (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/Professional-
Liability/2015PLSurveyNationalSummary11315.pdf; see also Guardado, supra note 71, at 8 
(reporting that 63.6% of responding OB-GYNs reported having been sued). 
73.  Carpentieri et al., supra note 72, at 3. 
74.  Id. at 4. 
75.  Id. at 3; see also Studdert et al., supra note 31, at 2612 (reporting that 59% of OB-GYNs 
indicated they often referred patients to other specialists in unnecessary circumstances). 
76.  Carpentieri et al., supra note 72, at 1–2. 
77.  How Much Does Medical Malpractice Insurance Cost?, GALLAGHER HEALTHCARE: 
INDUS. INSIGHTS BLOG (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.gallaghermalpractice.com/blog/post/how-
much-does-medical-malpractice-insurance-cost.  
78.  Id.; see also Jose R. Guardado, Medical Professional Liability Insurance Premiums: An 
Overview of the Market from 2006 to 2017, AM. MED. ASS’N POL’Y RES. PERSP. 1 (2018), 
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/government/ 
advocacy/policy-research-perspective-liability-insurance-premiums.pdf.  
79.  Carpentieri et al., supra note 72, at 2. 
80.  Jena et al., supra note 63, at 633. 
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were the most likely to be litigated.81 Thus, fear of litigation, high malpractice 
premiums, and the practice of defensive medicine are common and acute in 
obstetric care. 
B.  Practical Difficulties of Poor Prenatal Diagnoses 
     Negotiating the risks of civil lawsuits can be particularly difficult in 
obstetrics and other medical disciplines involving pregnancy because of the 
medicolegal conflicts that can arise.82 In obstetrics, the doctor has two 
patients, one wholly dependent on the other, with interrelated medical 
conditions that may come into conflict with one another.83 Additionally, in 
the United States, the mother has a broad right to terminate the prenatal life 
at will.84 Pregnancies that pose a substantial risk to the health or life of the 
mother represent particularly troubling cases, but the broad right to abort 
																																																						
81.  Anupam B. Jena et al., Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation Against US 
Physicians, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 892, 893 (2012). 
82.  See Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s 
Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451 (2000). 
83.  Frati et al., supra note 4, at 339–40. 
84.  The prevailing legal standards were articulated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). States may regulate and even prohibit abortion at 
or after fetal viability except where abortion is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for 
the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Id. at 879. Pre-viability regulations are 
legitimate only if they do not impose an undue burden on the right to abortion. Id. at 878. An 
undue burden exists if the purpose or effect of the regulation is to place a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. Id. Regulations to further the health or safety of 
the woman, to promote the state’s interest in prenatal life, to ensure the decision to abort is an 
informed decision, or to persuade a woman not to have the abortion, are also judged by the 
undue burden standard. Id. 
The guarantee of the right to a post-viability abortion to preserve the life or health of the 
mother may be fairly broad. The life and health of the mother exception was articulated in Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973), and explained in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 
410 U.S. 179, 191–92 (1973). Bolton held that “the medical judgment [concerning the need for 
the abortion for the life and health of the mother] may be exercised in the light of all factors—
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being 
of the patient. All these factors may relate to health.” Id. at 192. 
Most states, in fact, place substantial limitations on late-term abortions, either at fetal 
viability, or in the third trimester, or after a specified number of weeks. State Bans on Abortion 
Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/print/state-policy/ 
explore/state-policies-later-abortions (last visited Dec. 11, 2019). As of December 1, 2019, 
twenty-six states have post-viability abortion bans in effect that limit the woman’s health 
exception to physical health, and two states have laws in effect that do not include a health of 
the mother exception. Id. 
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such pregnancies and the general social acceptance of such abortions mitigate 
some of the difficulties in practice.85  
     Cases involving a poor prenatal diagnosis without a risk to the mother are 
often extremely complicated to address at a practical level. First, many severe 
conditions can be detected in utero but cannot be cured, whether before or 
after birth, and some may cause fetal demise.86 Options for prenatal and 
postnatal interventions are expanding, but abortion may be the only option 
to avoid the burdens of bearing a child expected to die in utero or shortly 
after birth, or bearing and raising a child with special needs.87 In cases where 
prenatal or postnatal treatment may be an option, practical considerations—
such as the cost of the treatment, the inconvenience, the risk to the mother’s 
health, the risk of a premature birth, and other potential side effects—may 
preclude treatment.88  
     Second, prior to the adverse diagnosis, the family typically expects the 
child to be born healthy. A common mantra of expectant mothers is, “As long 
as my child has ten fingers and ten toes, I am happy.” Even when family 
medical history or prior genetic screenings suggest an adverse condition is 
possible, the family may hope for the best and suppress fears and doubts.89 
The family is often unprepared for an adverse prenatal diagnosis, and a bad 
diagnosis and prognosis is likely to cause an emotional shock.90 The family 
																																																						
85.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (guaranteeing the right to abortion to save the life of the 
mother); GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 84 (indicating that every state that bans late-term 
abortion has a life of the mother exception); Legality of Abortion, 2018–2019 Demographic 
Tables, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/244097/legality-abortion-2018-demographic-
tables.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) (indicating only 18% of the respondents wanted 
abortion to be illegal under all circumstances, and 35% wanted abortion to be legal in only a 
few circumstances). The issue of early-term abortions on the basis of adverse prenatal 
diagnoses recently garnered attention after Indiana sought to prohibit them. The law was 
invalidated by a panel of the Seventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on that 
issue. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019). 
86.  Frati et al., supra note 4, at 339. 
87.  Id. at 342. 
88.  Id.  
89.  See Penelope Pitt, Belinda J. McClaren, & Jan Hodgson, Embodied Experiences of 
Prenatal Diagnosis of Fetal Abnormality and Pregnancy Termination, 24 REPROD. HEALTH 
MATTERS 168, 171 (2016) (“Melinda, who had previously terminated a pregnancy for a fetal 
abnormality, described receiving the news at her 12 week scan that her current pregnancy had 
abnormalities as ‘looking down the barrel of another termination.’”). 
90.  Himar H. Bijma et al., Decision-Making After Ultrasound Diagnosis of Fetal 
Abnormality, 16 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 82, 84–86 (2008); Tommy Carlsson & Elisabet 
Mattsson, Emotional and Cognitive Experiences During the Time of Diagnosis and Decision-
Making Following a Prenatal Diagnosis: A Qualitative Study of Males Presented with 
Congenital Heart Defect in the Fetus Carried by Their Pregnant Partner, 18 BMC PREGNANCY 
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must adjust to a new and adverse reality.91 The family may need to grieve.92 
At the same time, critical decisions often must be made related to the 
pregnancy, including whether to terminate the pregnancy.93 This is hardly an 
ideal mindset for decision-making. The family may look to the medical 
professional delivering the bad news for a specific recommendation, 
elevating the provider’s role to that of a surrogate decision-maker. 
     Third, regardless of the doctor’s moral values, the doctor is obliged (at 
least as a practical matter) to advise the woman that she has the option to 
terminate the pregnancy through abortion, unless the law prohibits the 
abortion in the circumstance.94 Some states prohibit some second- or third-
trimester abortions unless the woman’s health or life is in jeopardy.95 If the 
woman has a legal right to the abortion under the circumstance, however, the 
doctor must treat abortion as a valid medical option, even if the doctor will 
decline to perform the abortion.96 A provider risks a malpractice lawsuit if he 
or she fails to advise the woman that abortion is an option when there is 
evidence of a fetal anomaly and the woman can lawfully obtain an abortion 
in the state.97 The potential damages in the case could be substantial, 
increasing the risk a suit would be brought.98 
     Fourth, in states that regulate such abortions later in the pregnancy, 
providers face the additional challenge of a time constraint. As of December 
																																																						
& CHILDBIRTH 26 (2018); Joan G. Lalor et al., Unexpected Diagnosis of Fetal Abnormality: 
Women’s Encounters with Caregivers, 34 BIRTH 80, 83–86 (2007); Pitt, McClaren, & Hodgson, 
supra note 89, at 171; Stina Lou et al., Parental Response to Severe or Lethal Prenatal Diagnosis: 
A Systematic Review of Qualitative Studies, 37 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 731 (2017); see Tommy 
Carlsson et al., Involvement of Persons with Lived Experience of a Prenatal Diagnosis of 
Congenital Heart Defect: An Explorative Study To Gain Insights into Perspectives on Future 
Research, 2 RES. INVOLVEMENT & ENGAGEMENT 1, 8 (2016). 
91.  Bijma et al., supra note 90, at 85; Dixon, supra note 10, at 47. Cf. KAHNEMAN, supra 
note 26, at 302–304 (discussing the aversion to the loss, where the loss is an unrealized goal). 
92.  Bijma et al., supra note 90, at 85; Carlsson & Mattsson, supra note 90; Lalor et al., 
supra note 90, at 80–81. 
93.  Cf. Frati et al., supra note 4, at 342 (“In such circumstances, the pregnant woman is 
asked to make decisions about her own medical care that unavoidably involves the health, 
prognosis and even the possibility of survival of her unborn child. Women themselves might 
find it difficult to decide for or against treatment.”). 
94.  See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 318–19. See generally Jackson, supra note 4 (discussing 
the various classes of negligence actions that may arise in this context). 
95.  See supra note 84. 
96.  See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 318–19. 
97.  E.g., Simms v. United States, No. 3:11-0932, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174132, at *1–3 
(S.D. W. Va. Dec. 17, 2014) (involving disputes about whether a woman was advised of her 
right to terminate a pregnancy in conjunction with the adverse prenatal diagnosis). 
98.  See infra note 129. 
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2019, forty-three states prohibit nontherapeutic abortions at some point in 
the pregnancy, ranging from the twentieth week to about the twenty-sixth 
week of the pregnancy.99 To give a concrete example, if the state prohibits 
such abortions after twenty-four weeks, and the fetal anomaly is discovered 
at twenty-two weeks, the provider has just two weeks to allow the woman to 
recover from the shock, make the informed decision, and have the abortion, 
if that is what she chooses.100  
     Fifth, diagnoses are often based on imperfect, ambiguous, or probabilistic 
information that easily can be misunderstood.101 A classic case is Down 
syndrome.102 The available tests for Down syndrome are not perfectly 
accurate, and understanding the significance of the error rate is difficult. To 
illustrate, if a test for Down syndrome has a sensitivity rate of 99.5%, then 
approximately 5 of every 1000 mothers carrying a child with Down syndrome 
will receive an erroneous negative reading if tested; the test misses the actual 
existence of the condition 0.5% of the time.103 If the Down syndrome test has 
a specificity rate of 99.9%, then approximately 1 in every 1,000 mothers who 
receive a positive Down syndrome test result are, in fact, not carrying a child 
with that condition; the test erroneously reports that the condition exists 
0.1% of the time.104 The remaining 99.4% of the tests (994 of 1,000 tests) 
produce accurate readings. While this seems highly reliable, the statistics are 
misleading. In fact, a false positive is indistinguishable from a true positive, 
and the true positives are some part of the approximately 994 accurate 
readings. Suppose, for instance, that 100,000 pregnant women each has a 1 
in 250 chance that her child in utero has Down syndrome.105 Approximately 
400 of these pregnancies will therefore be affected with Down syndrome, and 
approximately 99,600 pregnancies will not be affected. (The risk of Down 
syndrome affecting the pregnancy increases exponentially with maternal age, 
from approximately 1 in 1,600 pregnancies at the age of 20, to 1 in 30 
pregnancies at the age of 45.106 Down syndrome is estimated as affecting 
																																																						
99.  GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 84. 
100.  Frati et al., supra note 4, at 344. 
101.  Cf. Jackson, supra note 4, at 535–36 (referencing the inaccuracies of tests for Tay 
Sachs). 
102.  See generally Dixon, supra note 10; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1305–10. 
103.  See Dixon, supra note 10, at 37. 
104.  See id.  
105.  Mark W. Leach, How Accurate Is the New Blood Test for Down Syndrome?, DOWN 
SYNDROME PRENATAL TESTING (July 30, 2013), http://www.downsyndromeprenataltesting. 
com/how-accurate-is-the-new-blood-test-for-down-syndrome/.  
106.  David S. Newberger, Down Syndrome: What You Need To Know When You’re 
Pregnant, 62 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 837 (Aug. 15, 2000). Cf. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1305 (noting 
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about 1 in every 500 pregnancies.107)  Using the 99.9% sensitivity and 99.5% 
selectivity rates, if all these women were tested, there would be approximately 
360 accurate positive readings (Down syndrome correctly detected), only 40 
erroneous negative readings (Down syndrome missed by the test), 100 false 
positive readings (Down syndrome erroneously reported as detected), and 
95,500 accurate negative readings (Down syndrome correctly determined not 
to be present). The doctors that review the results and the mothers receiving 
the results will see a negative reading in approximately 95,540 instances and 
a positive reading in approximately 460 instances, without knowing if their 
test produced a true or false result. In fact, approximately one of five women 
who receive positive test results (21.74%—approximately 100 out of 460 
positive readings) would not actually be carrying a child with Down syndrome; 
these women received the false-positive test results.108 If a woman has a 1 in 
500 chance that her child in utero has Down syndrome, a positive test result 
will be a erroneous 35.71% of the time, based on a 99.9% specificity and a 
99.5% sensitivity rate. Depending on the reasons for the false reading, 
additional testing may produce repeated errors.109 The additional risk of 
human error increases the possibility of an erroneous result being reported.110 
Unfortunately, the abortion rate in cases of a Down syndrome diagnosis is 
estimated to be as high as eighty to ninety percent, and all women, no matter 
																																																						
that the chance of having a baby with Down syndrome is above 1 in 250 at age thirty-five) 
(quoting Len Leshin, Prenatal Screening for Down Syndrome, DOWN SYNDROME: HEALTH 
ISSUES (1995), http://www.ds-health.com/prenatal.htm); Dixon, supra note 10, at 10 (asserting 
the risk of Down syndrome afflicting the pregnancy of a woman who is thirty-five is 1 in 385, 
and the risk of her having a fetus with other anomalies is 1 in 434, making her total risk of 
chromosomal anomaly 1 in 204). 
107.  Jean Gekas et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing for Fetal Chromosome Abnormalities: 
Review of Clinical and Ethical Issues, 9 APPLICATION CLINICAL GENETICS 15, 15 (2016).  
108.  See Leach, supra note 105; cf. Hoffman, supra note 45, at 994–97 (discussing this 
failure to pay attention to base rates). In his book THE DRUNKARD’S WALK: HOW RANDOMNESS 
RULES OUR LIVES 114–16 (2008), theoretical physicist Leonard Mlodinow illustrates this 
surprising truth of statistics with a personal story. He describes that in 1989, he tested positive 
for HIV. His doctor advised him the test returned false positives in only 1 of 1,000 instances, 
and his doctor concluded that Mlodinow had only a 1 in 1,000 chance of being healthy given 
the positive test. According to Mlodinow’s calculations, however, since a person with his 
characteristics has only a 1 in 10,000 chance of being HIV positive, he actually had a 10 out of 
11 chance that he was not HIV positive despite the positive test. 
109.  See Dixon, supra note 10, at 36. 
110.  See id. at 40–41; Brandy Zadrozny, Parents Sue Doctors over “Wrongful Abortion,” 
DAILY BEAST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.thedailybeast.com/parents-sue-doctors-over-
wrongful-abortion/ (allegation that human error caused an erroneous diagnosis of an intersex 
fetus). 
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their age, are encouraged to undergo Down syndrome screening.111 Thus, the 
harms arising from even small error rates may be greatly exaggerated by poor 
comprehension of what those error rates mean. 
     Even where the diagnosis is relatively certain, though, there may be 
insufficient information for a reasonably accurate prognosis.112 Medicine’s 
ability to detect conditions that typify serious special needs far exceeds 
medicine’s ability to specify what those special needs will be, much less what 
the condition will mean for the day-to-day life of the family or the affected 
individual.113 As one author notes: 
[T]he range of functioning among individuals with the same 
disabilities can vary dramatically. An individual with Down 
syndrome, for example, may be profoundly mentally 
retarded and severely restricted in motor functioning or may 
be capable of meaningful employment, relationships, and 
community engagement. A child with cystic fibrosis likewise 
might die from it, survive with physical disability, or suffer 
no noticeable impairment.114 
     Any parent facing a poor prenatal diagnosis for a child, though, will want 
the doctor to describe what the diagnosis will mean in practice in the 
future.115 This dynamic encourages medical professionals to speak to matters 
beyond the scope of their expertise, presenting what may be incomplete or 
incarnate information, or speaking with greater confidence than a fair view 
of the situation merits.116 
     Sixth, in these situations, the pregnant woman facing a poor prenatal 
diagnosis may feel a strong sense of isolation.117 The choice to have an 
abortion or not is legally hers and hers alone, regardless of the desires of 
																																																						
111.  Diehr, supra note 4, at 1289, 1301, 1306. But see Dixon, supra note 10, at 5–7 (arguing 
that the estimate of 90% may be too high); Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 
S. Ct. 1780, 1782, 1790–91 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing a Washington Post article 
that placed the abortion rate at 67% for Down syndrome diagnoses in the United States). 
112.  Diehr, supra note 4, at 1311. 
113.  E.g., Dixon, supra note 10, at 37–38. 
114.  Hensel, supra note 7, at 183 (footnotes omitted). 
115.  See Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 83–86. 
116.  Dixon, supra note 10, at 4, 21–24, 27. 
117.  Denise Côté-Arsenault & Erin Denney-Koelsch, “My Baby Is a Person”: Parents’ 
Experiences with Life-Threatening Fetal Diagnosis, 14 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1302, 1304, 1306–07 
(2011). 
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others, including the father of the child.118 A medical provider must, 
therefore, tailor the communications to the mother. The provider may 
marginalize others in the woman’s decision-making process, whether 
intentionally or not.119 The diagnosis, prognosis, and option to terminate the 
pregnancy may also be presented to the woman in a setting in which she is 
physically isolated from those she may look to for advice, including family 
members that are not present, other medical providers, or spiritual 
counselors. This may induce her to rely on the medical provider as her sole 
or chief advisor in the matter. 
     Seventh and finally, as intimated above, the provider’s risk of a lawsuit for 
failing to advise a woman of the right to an abortion is not wholly eliminated 
by actually advising the woman of the right to the abortion. Given the 
emotional shock of a poor prenatal diagnosis, the parents may not have a 
clear recollection of the conversation that follows.120 This memory lapse may 
lead to a lawsuit if the family continues the pregnancy to term but claims the 
provider withheld information that would have induced the woman to 
terminate the pregnancy.121 As discussed above, even if it will be difficult to 
prove a breach in the standard of care because of the factual dispute, a lawyer 
may well take the case because of the potential for a large verdict. Also, as 
described above, the lawsuit itself causes many hardships for the provider, 
whether the provider wins or loses. 
     The civil tort claims associated with poor prenatal diagnoses and the birth 
of children with special needs are a familiar subject in legal journals.122 The 
nomenclature of these claims—“wrongful birth,” “wrongful life,” and 
																																																						
118.  Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–
96 (1992) (invalidating a spousal notification law as unduly burdening the woman’s right to 
an abortion); Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 86. 
119.  Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 85. 
120.  See Carlsson et al., supra note 90, at 6–8; Tommy Carlsson et al., Experiences of 
Informational Needs and Received Information Following a Prenatal Diagnosis of Congenital 
Heart Defect, 36 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 515, 517–20 (2016). 
121.  Cf., e.g., Simms v. United States, No. 3:11-0932, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174132, at *1–
3 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 17, 2014) (involving disputes about whether a woman was advised of her 
right to terminate a pregnancy in conjunction with the adverse prenatal diagnosis). 
122.  See generally, e.g., Jackson, supra note 4 (discussing the various classes of negligence 
actions that may arise in this context). See Constance Frisby Fain, Wrongful Life: Legal and 
Medical Aspects, 75 KY. L.J. 585, 587–88 (1986); Frati et al., supra note 4, at 343; Hensel, supra 
note 7; Mogill, supra note 4, at 827–28; Schuster, supra note 4; Sheth, supra note 4, at 645; 
Strasser, supra note 31, at 821–22; Brown, supra note 4; Bernstein, supra note 4; Diehr, supra 
note 4, at 1295–1304; Foutz, supra note 4; Kennedy, supra note 4; Say, supra note 14; Kate 
Wevers, Note, Prenatal Torts and Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
257 (2010). 
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“wrongful pregnancy,” for instance—is more ambiguous than helpful for our 
purposes, and some of these terms may be used for cases that do not involve 
disabilities, let alone prenatally diagnosed disabilities.123 Simply put, if the 
jurisdiction permits it, a medical provider who allegedly failed to disclose an 
unfavorable fetal condition, or who allegedly failed to recommend abortion 
adequately in the case, could be sued based on allegations that the failure 
breached the standard of care and caused damages, namely the lost 
opportunity to abort the pregnancy because of the disability.124 The plaintiff 
in such a suit will typically be either or both parents or the child, depending 
on the circumstances and what the state allows.125 When the woman has a 
legal right to an elective abortion, which typically includes a eugenic 
abortion,126 the claimant may allege that the provider’s failure to discuss the 
																																																						
123.  See Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 9 n.3 (Mass. 1990) (“These labels are not 
instructive. Any ‘wrongfulness’ lies not in the life, the birth, the conception, or the pregnancy, 
but in the negligence of the physician. The harm, if any, is not the birth itself but the effect of 
the defendant’s negligence on the parents’ physical, emotional, and financial well-being 
resulting from the denial to the parents of their right, as the case may be, to decide whether to 
bear a child or whether to bear a child with a genetic or other defect.”); Fain, supra note 122, 
at 587–88 (noting that “a great deal of confusion has existed regarding the use of the term 
‘wrongful life,’ with that label being given to a variety of factual situations” and describing 
wrongful life suits not related to disabilities); Hensel, supra note 7, at 150–62, 164–66; Jackson, 
supra note 4, at 566 (suggesting the “wrongful life” label is prejudicial to the merits of the cause 
of action); Mogill, supra note 4, at 827–28 (discussing the additional terms of “wrongful 
conception” and “wrongful pregnancy”); Sheth, supra note 4, at 645 (noting “jurists and 
scholars do not always use the terms consistently”); Strasser, supra note 31 (discussing the 
subtle distinctions among the states’ treatment of wrongful conception and wrongful 
pregnancy, wrongful birth, and wrongful life, and practical difficulties in distinguishing one 
claim from another); Foutz, supra note 4, at 483–84, 488–98; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 482–
90; Say, supra note 14, at 261, 264. 
124.  Wevers, supra note 122, at 263–66. See generally Fain, supra note 122, at 587–614 
(discussing wrongful life suits); Hensel, supra note 7, at 142–44, 164–70; Jackson, supra note 
4 (discussing the various classes of negligence actions that may arise in this context); Bernstein, 
supra note 4, at 299; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1287–88; Foutz, supra note 4; Say, supra note 14, 
at 266. 
125.  Fain, supra note 122, at 585–86; Hensel, supra note 7, at 142–44; Bernstein, supra 
note 4, at 300–02; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1287–88, 1295–98; Foutz, supra note 4, at 483–84; 
Schuster, supra note 4, at 2337–38. 
126.  Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 
888 F.3d 300, 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2018) (invalidating a state law prohibiting abortions based 
on race, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, or diagnosis or potential diagnosis), vacated in 
part, 727 Fed. App’x 208 (7th Cir.), vacated, 917 F.3d 532 (7th Cir.), rev’d in part, Box v. 
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019). In this case, on a petition for 
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Thomas argued in a concurrence, “The Court’s 
decision to allow further percolation [on the issue of state bans on abortions based on race, 
sex, or disability] should not be interpreted as agreement with the decisions below. Enshrining 
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adverse condition or the abortion option adequately was a proximate cause 
of the child being born alive.127 Damages in these suits may include, but are 
not necessarily limited to, the extraordinary expenses of caring for the 
child.128 The damage award can easily run into the millions, depending on the 
child’s condition, even when the family has private insurance that will absorb 
a portion of these expenses or require medical providers to reduce their 
charges.129 
     The imprecise language used in case law and statutes, the evolving nature 
of the law, and distinctions among the legal standards employed across the 
nation make it difficult to detail precisely in which jurisdictions, and under 
what circumstances, a medical provider might be sued for the birth of a child 
																																																						
a constitutional right to an abortion based solely on the race, sex, or disability of an unborn 
child, as Planned Parenthood advocates, would constitutionalize the views of the 20th–century 
eugenics movement.” Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1792 
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
127.  E.g., Simms v. United States, No. 3:11–0932, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174132, at *1, *9–
10 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 17, 2014) (involving disputes about whether a woman was advised of her 
right to terminate a pregnancy in conjunction with the adverse prenatal diagnosis). 
128.  See generally Belsky, supra note 44, at 196–205 (discussing the damages allowed by 
law under the various claims); Bernstein, supra note 4, at 306; Brown, supra note 4, at 864; 
Diehr, supra note 4, at 1293–94; Fain, supra note 122, at 590; Frati et al., supra note 4, at 343–
44; Hensel, supra note 7, at 150–62; Jackson, supra note 4; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 489; 
Mogill, supra note 4, at 828–31, 842–72; Schuster, supra note 4, at 2336; Wevers, supra note 
122, at 264–66. 
129.  E.g., Simms v. United States, 839 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 2016) (reviewing a 
$12,222,743 wrongful birth award, and finding the trial court correctly used the amount the 
hospital charged for the services, rather than the amount Medicaid paid, but remanding for a 
statutory post-verdict collateral source hearing); Wilkie v. Aslam, No. BPG-08-1425, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 97503, at *13–14 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2009) (rejecting the argument that a wrongful 
birth damage award is to be reduced by the amount paid for the child through public assistance 
programs); Wuth v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 359 P.3d 841 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (upholding a 
verdict totaling $50,000,000 on wrongful birth and wrongful life claims); Chamberland v. 
Physicians for Women’s Health, LLC, No. CV010164040S, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 451 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (upholding a $12,000,000 wrongful birth award, plus interest, subject 
to a $428,937.70 collateral source deduction); Demetrios C. Batsides & Melissa S. Geller, The 
Cross-Border Dilemma: Wrongful-Birth and -Life Litigation in NJ, N.J. L.J. (May 11, 2016, 3:42 
PM), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1202757420585/ (indicating that reported 
New Jersey settlements and verdicts in such cases have “almost always exceeded $1 million 
and have often ranged between $2.5 million and $10 million”); Andrew G. Slutkin, Wrongful 
Birth…, MD. MED. MALPRACTICE LAW. BLOG (July 1, 2010), https://www.marylandmedical 
malpracticelawyerblog.com/wrongful_birth_in_maryland_ver/ (referencing a $7.1 million 
wrongful birth verdict); Verdicts & Settlements, O’CONNOR, PARSONS, LANE & NOBLE, 
http://lawnj.net/verdicts/28million-wrongful-birth/ (describing a $28 million verdict for a 
wrongful birth claim) (last visited Aug. 31, 2019). 
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with special needs.130 Many states have declined to recognize such claims, at 
least at this point, and many state legislatures have enacted laws prohibiting 
such suits in one manner or another.131 Currently, though, four states allow 
lawsuits against a medical provider by a person that claims he or she should 
have been aborted.132 About half of the states recognize suits brought by the 
mother, and possibly the father and other family members, against the 
medical provider after the birth of a child that the mother claims she would 
have aborted had she known of the child’s adverse condition.133 
C.  The Practical Effects of These Difficulties 
     In each communication with a family about a poor prenatal diagnosis or 
prognosis, and particularly in reporting the initial bad news, the provider has 
to determine how to share the information. The factors outlined above will 
affect this decision. With respect to terminating the pregnancy, the doctor is 
typically obliged to discuss the option, so the question is not “Do I discuss it?” 
but rather, “Do I recommend it?” (the third factor).134 This decision may shape 
the entire discussion. There may be no realistic option to treat the condition 
(the first factor). Terminating the pregnancy in such cases will often appear 
an appealing and even a merciful option, at least compared to either the 
unexpected prospect of caring for a disabled child and the uncertainty about 
how difficult the child’s and the family’s future will be, or alternatively the 
prospect of continuing the burdens of a pregnancy in which the child is likely 
to die in utero (the second factor). Moreover, if the provider expects the 
family to choose abortion, emphasizing the adverse prognosis may be 
psychologically beneficial and even therapeutic, by reducing doubts about 
the decision.135 In states that restrict late-term nontherapeutic abortions, the 
																																																						
130.  See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 307–10 (discussing Nevada’s and Indiana’s refusal to 
adopt the “wrongful life” label for such claims); Strasser, supra note 31, at 833 (discussing the 
subtle distinctions among the states’ treatment of wrongful conception and wrongful 
pregnancy, wrongful birth, and wrongful life, and practical difficulties in distinguishing one 
claim from another). 
131.  Bernstein, supra note 4, at 311–15; Frati et al., supra note 4, at 344; Say, supra note 
14, at 261–64. 
132.  Diehr, supra note 4, at 1297 & n.80 (identifying California, New Jersey, Washington, 
and Maine); Schuster, supra note 4, at 2336. 
133.  Diehr, supra note 4, at 1297 (asserting twenty-three state recognize wrongful birth 
actions); Frati et al., supra note 4, at 344 (listing twenty-four states); Say, supra note 14, at 261 
n.70 (citing cases from twenty-four jurisdictions). 
134.  See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 499–500. 
135.  See Majike Korenromp, Parental Adaptation to Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal 
Anomalies 20, 22, 26, 34–35, 40, 43, 46, 50, 54, 60, 66, 69, 76, 82, 85–86, 94–95, 110, 126–27, 
132–37, 140 (2006), https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/9774. 
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doctor may be obliged to press for a prompt or immediate decision (the 
fourth factor). Psychological or physical isolation of the woman in the 
decision-making process can make her vulnerable to the influence of the 
medical provider, whether that is the medical provider’s intention or not (the 
sixth factor).136 Imperfect information as to either the diagnosis or the 
prognosis, or both, also allows the medical provider to interpret and present 
the data as the provider may choose in answering the critical question of 
“What’s going to happen?” (the fifth factor).  
     In this context, the risks associated with a lawsuit or other disciplinary 
action (the seventh factor) can further incentivize the provider to 
recommend an abortion.137 Abortion eliminates the risk of wrongful birth or 
wrongful life suits by excluding the precondition of the suit, namely the child 
being born alive.138 Abortion practically eliminates the risk of negligence 
claims or disciplinary complaints based on an erroneous diagnosis or 
prognosis—such as a false positive on the Down syndrome test, or an 
erroneous prediction that the disability will be severe—because the error 
would not likely be discovered once the abortion occurs.139 If the error is 
discovered and disclosed before the abortion, the woman typically has not 
suffered legally compensable harm. The risk of injury to the woman through 
the abortion can be addressed through signed consent forms disclosing the 
risk.140 This risk also falls on the abortion provider, who might not be the 
person that recommends the abortion. Moreover, even if the medical 
provider is successfully sued for recommending an abortion, the damages 
																																																						
136.  Dixon, supra note 10, at 39–40; see Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 85–86. 
137.  See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 318–19; Diehr, supra note 4, at 1289; Dixon, supra 
note 10, at 39–40, 51–53; Fain, supra note 122, at 626–29 (noting that doctors are concerned 
about wrongful life suits); Jeffrey Klagholz & Albert L. Strunk, Overview of the 2009 ACOG 
Survey on Professional Liability, ACADEMIA, https://www.academia.edu/707493/Overview_ 
of_the_2009_ACOG_survey_on_professional_liability (last visited Nov. 20, 2019);  see also 
Ronen Perry & Yehuda Adar, Wrongful Abortion: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 5 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL. L. & ETHICS 507, 523–24, 544–47 (2005) (arguing that the law currently does not 
provide an adequate incentive to providers to abstain from giving inaccurate information that 
may lead to an unnecessary abortion). Recommending abortion in such instances to mitigate 
the risks associated with the birth of a special needs child is an example of substituting one 
method of care for another, as discussed by Schlanger, supra note 25. In fact, this is roughly 
equivalent to a substitution that Schlanger describes as “not entirely plausible,” namely 
selecting death over a severe injury to a potential plaintiff. Id. at 530.  
138.  Hensel, supra note 7, at 165–67; Kennedy, supra note 4, at 484.  
139.  Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 546–47. But see infra, Part III.  
140.  Cf. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1976) 
(upholding a law requiring a woman to sign a written consent form detailing the risks 
associated with an abortion). 
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awarded may be substantially less than a suit if the child were born alive and 
with disabilities.141  
     Beyond merely discussing or recommending abortion, the medical 
provider is incentivized to persuade the woman to accept the abortion.142 
After all, if the provider merely recommends an abortion, and the woman 
declines, the provider may face substantially the same legal and disciplinary 
actions if the woman does not recall the conversation or claims the provider 
did not do enough to explain the dire situation.143 Moreover, persuasion can 
be accomplished subtly.144 The diagnosis and prognosis might be framed to 
emphasize the probability of fetal demise or the low expected quality of life 
for the child.145 Uncertainty about the future and the attendant feeling of a 
loss of control may easily motivate the woman to agree to an induced 
abortion.146 The cost and difficulty to the family of providing medical care 
might be discussed. Moral or religious objections, or emotional aversion to 
abortion, might be minimized by framing this as an extraordinary case. The 
woman might be gently pressed for a prompt decision, minimizing the time 
she has to overcome the initial shock or to connect with personal, medical, 
or spiritual advisors.147 The provider may justify these communications, 
professionally and personally, reasoning that the woman has to be prepared 
for the worst, that more details would be overwhelming, that the family will 
suffer less mental distress with an abortion if they have fewer doubts as to the 
need to terminate the pregnancy, and that termination is the right decision.148 
																																																						
141.  See Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 518–22, 544–47 (discussing the limited damages 
that would be awarded in a wrongful abortion case, as compared to other suits). 
142.  See Diehr, supra note 4. 
143.  Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6(b) (2019) (“The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the 
live birth of his or her child shall not be a defense in any action against a third party, nor shall 
the failure or refusal be considered in awarding damages in any such action.”); Troppi v. Scarf, 
187 N.W.2d 511, 519–20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (rejecting the argument, in a case involving a 
pharmacists’ malpractice in failing to provide contraceptives, that the family should have 
mitigated its damages by placing the child for adoption); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 
N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977) (rejecting the argument that parents should have mitigated 
their damages by aborting an unplanned pregnancy arising from a failed vasectomy). 
144.  See Buck, supra note 31, at 923; Dixon, supra note 10, at 32–34, 40–45. 
145.  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 26, at 88, 363–70 (discussing the influence of framing on 
human choices); Diehr, supra note 4, at 1289. 
146.  See Bijma et al., supra note 90, at 85. 
147.  See Dixon, supra note 10, at 42–43. 
148.  See Frati et al., supra note 4, at 352 (“We would like to stress that the duty to inform 
should be tempered by maternal desire. The role of information assumes particularly complex 
meaning when the choice of the mother affects others (the unborn baby or newborn, father, 
siblings), including the physician whose conduct has influenced this choice.”); Korenromp, 
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Indeed, some states have recognized a therapeutic privilege allowing 
providers to withhold information from the patient if, in the provider’s 
assessment, the disclosure would do more harm to the patient than good.149  
     One must question whether any particular woman can give informed 
consent for the abortion in such circumstances, especially if she is pressed for 
a prompt decision, independent of other personal, medical, or spiritual 
advisors, and especially if she was predisposed to reject abortion in such cases 
prior to the emotional shock of the diagnosis or prognosis.150 That being said, 
an attorney would hesitate to sue a doctor alleging lack of informed consent 
when consent is documented because (1) it is difficult to overcome the legal 
significance of a signed consent form, (2) the court may determine that a 
competently performed abortion is not a legally cognizable injury despite an 
inadequate disclosure, and (3) the amount of the monetary award, if the claim 
is successful, would be extremely uncertain.151  
     In short, the medical provider could justify an attempt to eliminate the 
family’s reasonable hope of a decent life for this child so as to induce the 
woman to accept the abortion promptly, in part to mitigate the risks of 
liability or other formal or informal punishment. This justification can be 
used to excuse gross infringements of patient autonomy through 
misinformation, incomplete information, or pressure tactics.152 In fact, 
academic studies show many women that have chosen to continue the 
																																																						
supra note 135, at 20, 22, 26, 34–35, 40, 43, 46, 50, 54, 60, 66, 69, 76, 82, 85–86, 94–95, 110, 
126–27, 132–37, 140. 
149.  See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Logan v. 
Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 300 (Conn. 1983); Cuc Thi Ngo v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 
358 P.3d 26, 38 n.14 (Haw. 2015); Hondroulis v Schumacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 413 (La. 1989); 
Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 700 (Minn. 1977); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 301 
(Tex. 1967). 
150.  Bijma et al., supra note 90, at 85; Buck, supra note 31, at 918–21; Diehr, supra note 
4, at 1301–02; Dixon, supra note 10, at 4. See Emma F. France et al., What Parents Say About 
Disclosing the End of Their Pregnancy Due to Fetal Abnormality, 29 MIDWIFERY 24, 25, 27, 30 
(2013) (noting that some interviewed after terminating a pregnancy due to an adverse prenatal 
diagnosis “chose [to disclose the situation to others using] language to convey their perceived 
lack of choice over the decision.”). 
151.  See Buck, supra note 31, at 919; Curran, supra note 10, at 135–39, 149–54, 157. 
152.  See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The physician’s 
privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons must be carefully circumscribed, 
however, for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself. The privilege does not accept 
the paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent simply because divulgence might 
prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the patient really needs.”). 
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pregnancy despite the adverse diagnosis are disappointed with the manner in 
which the diagnosis was delivered and in the subsequent support provided.153 
     While one might assume this would only be a concern in states that permit 
suits for the birth of a child with special needs, the influence of these suits 
extends beyond the border of those states. Some practitioners may not know 
their state laws and operate on the assumption that they can be sued. 
Individual providers that develop defensive medical practices in a 
jurisdiction that permits such suits may not adapt those practices when they 
move to a new state, or when state law changes. Providers who treat patients 
from other states may be subject to suit under the rules of the other state.154 
Moreover, educational institutions and national professional associations 
may promote a national standard of practice based in part on the risk of 
lawsuits in the hostile jurisdictions.155 Matthew Diehr points, for instance, to 
the practice guidelines promulgated by the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists in 2007, recommending that all pregnant 
women should be screened to determine if the pregnancy is afflicted with 
certain congenital conditions, including Down syndrome and other 
conditions that cannot be treated in utero.156 As such, even in states that 
prohibit such lawsuits, practitioners may still be influenced to practice 
defensive medicine in response to poor prenatal diagnoses.  
     In summary, addressing any adverse prenatal fetal diagnosis with the 
family poses complex practical challenges for medical providers, but the 
current medicolegal arrangement encourages providers to promote abortion 
in cases of an adverse prenatal diagnoses, even at the cost of informed 
decision-making. As noted, the diagnosis may not be accurate, but even if it 
is reliable, the providers often cannot provide a reliable and specific 
prognosis as to how this particular child will be affected by the condition 
detected. Both the nature and severity of the child’s future functional 
limitations are typically in doubt. Nevertheless, legal and professional 
obligations and risks, and the emotional dynamics of the situation, encourage 
providers to persuade the woman to terminate the pregnancy, even if the 
diagnosis or prognosis is doubtful or speculative. After all, errors of 
specificity—that is, recommending abortion based on a false-positive 
																																																						
153.  Lalor et al., supra note 90, at 81. 
154.  Cf. Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Hood, 911 A.2d 841, 842–43 (Md. 2006) (applying Maryland 
law to a wrongful birth case against North Carolina medical laboratories); Fonda v. Wapner, 
No. 109244/09, 2012 N.Y Misc. LEXIS 667, at *33–34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2012) (applying 
Colorado law to a Philadelphia physician that practices in New York in a wrongful birth case), 
aff’d, 103 A.D.3d 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
155.  Diehr, supra note 4, at 1304–12, 1317–18. 
156.  Id. 
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diagnosis or on an erroneously adverse prognosis—carry a small risk of real-
world consequence for the medical provider compared to errors of 
sensitivity—failing to detect and disclose an adverse condition while abortion 
is still an option. Medical providers are better off predicting the worst 
possible outcome, purposefully extinguishing the reasonable and legitimate 
hopes of the family. If the pregnancy is aborted, everyone can assume the 
provider’s predictions were accurate, excusing the family’s decision. 
Moreover, if the woman continues the pregnancy, the outcome will not be 
worse than the provider predicted, mitigating the perception of a bad 
outcome attributable to the provider. Even in jurisdictions that prohibit such 
lawsuits, practitioners may be influenced by the public policy of the states 
that allow such suits, whether through ignorance of the local law, personal 
practices not specifically adapted to a particular state’s policy, or national 
practice standards designed to protect practitioners in hostile jurisdictions.157 
																																																						
157.  Johnson provides an excellent commentary: 
The doctor may be wrong about what the law requires or prohibits, 
yet the doctor’s understanding of the law is honestly asserted. Non-expert 
individuals dealing with an extensive body of rules that govern their 
actions on a daily basis do not ordinarily seek legal counsel and instead 
rely substantially on informal, word-of-mouth sources. At a very early 
point, the time and expense required to secure a more authoritative 
description of the law simply makes the effort impractical and unbearable. 
Any rule-oriented system, in which the specific rules are not easily 
accessible to those bound by them, will experience a similar informal, 
underground communication network. 
In their clinical decision making, physicians are more likely to turn to 
physician colleagues for advice rather than referring to journal articles or 
other decision supports. This same pattern may operate in their seeking 
advice as to the legal requirements for their practice, crowding out counsel 
from persons with more legal expertise. Intuitively as well, one has to 
believe that doctors trust other doctors more than they do lawyers. 
Doctors value clinical experience rather than rules and guidelines in 
treatment decision making. This heuristic may operate in the context of 
assessing legal risk and developing responsive behaviors as well. Thus, the 
stories told by doctors about their own or others’ experiences with the law 
take on even more power in part because they fit the learning and 
evidence-gathering patterns generally familiar in medicine. In addition, 
stories told within physician groups are likely to amplify extremes in terms 
of the rendition of the facts of the case, as well as the view that the system 
is offensive and unfair. 
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III. MELENEY-DISTASSIO V. WEINSTEIN 
     Many of the concerns described in the preceding section are illustrated, by 
example or counterexample, through the Connecticut case of Meleney-
Distassio v. Weinstein, a recent “wrongful abortion” lawsuit.158 In this case, 
the plaintiffs, a husband and a wife, sued the wife’s OB-GYN and a consulting 
physician alleging the providers were liable for recommending that the wife 
obtain an abortion.159 The couple had previous difficulties conceiving and 
bringing a pregnancy to term.160 During the pregnancy at issue in the lawsuit, 
a 3D ultrasound reportedly confirmed the fetus was developing club feet.161 
The physicians were concerned this was the harbinger of a serious fetal 
chromosomal abnormality, called Trisomy 18 syndrome.162 
     Trisomy 18 syndrome is a relatively common defect in a particular 
chromosome—that is, an aberration in the person’s DNA.163 It can cause one 
or more serious and potentially fatal congenital physical malformations.164 
These might include, for instance, openings in the abdomen so the internal 
organs are not contained, heart defects, and urinary tract defects preventing 
																																																						
When the rule is miscommunicated, it will have an impact quite 
different from that intended, possibly to the disadvantage of the patient, 
the doctor, and the public. Legal standards applicable to the medical 
practice tend to be complex or fact-sensitive and, thus, are particularly 
resistant to accurate mouth-to-mouth-to-mouth communication on the 
grapevine. Yet, this informal communication network is the source of 
choice for physicians for much of their information and learning about 
legal requirements that affect their practice. 
Johnson, supra note 9, at 994–95. 
158.  For other examples of wrongful abortion lawsuits arising from erroneous prenatal 
diagnoses, see Johnson v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1993) (HIV diagnosis); Breyne 
v. Potter, 574 S.E.2d 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (Down syndrome diagnosis); Martinez v. Long 
Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1987) (microcephaly or anencephaly 
diagnosis); Zadrozny, supra note 110 (intersex diagnosis). 
159.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2861, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014). 
160.  Id. at *3–4. 
161.  See Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. Obtains Defense Verdict in Groundbreaking 
Wrongful Fetal Termination Case, NEUBERT PEPE & MONTEITH P.C. (Nov. 2016), 
http://www.npmlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Shevell-Stockman-Maiocco-1116.pdf 
[hereinafter NPM Advisory]. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Anna Cereda & John C. Carey, The Trisomy 18 Syndrome, ORPHANET JOURNAL OF 
RARE DISEASES 1 (Oct. 23, 2012), https://ojrd.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1750-
1172-7-81.  
164.  Id. 
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the bladder from being voided in utero.165 Pregnancies affected by Trisomy 
18 often end in miscarriage or stillbirth due to these congenital 
malformations, especially if the fetus is male.166 Most parents who receive a 
Trisomy 18 prenatal diagnosis choose an elective abortion.167 
     The lawsuit alleged that on June 14, 2010, when the wife was twenty-one 
weeks pregnant, the consulting physician performed an amniocentesis, 
drawing amniotic fluid to test it for signs of the chromosomal abnormality.168 
The following day, the laboratory issued a report to the physicians indicating 
that the initial test result was positive for Trisomy 18.169 The report, however, 
came with the warning that no irreversible therapeutic action should be taken 
based on this preliminary result.170 A second, more reliable test was 
pending.171 
     Connecticut law provided, “No abortion may be performed upon a 
pregnant woman after viability of the fetus except when necessary to preserve 
the life or health of the pregnant woman.”172 At twenty–one weeks, viability 
was likely imminent.173 The law further specified, “The decision to terminate 
a pregnancy prior to the viability of the fetus shall be solely that of the 
pregnant woman in consultation with her physician.”174  
     The lawsuit alleged that on June 15, 2010, the OB-GYN contacted the wife 
by telephone and advised her the test result indicated a serious chromosomal 
defect that would result in fetal suffering and death before or shortly after 
birth.175 The suit alleged that the OB-GYN urged the woman to terminate the 
pregnancy immediately, before the law precluded her from doing so, and the 
doctor provided the woman contact information for a clinic that could 
perform the elective abortion.176 A prompt telephone call by the woman 
showed the clinic could not perform the abortion immediately, and so the 
consulting physician referred the woman to another physician, who 
																																																						
165.  Id. at 1, 3. 
166.  Id. at 3–5. 
167.  Id. at 2–3. 
168.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2861, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014). 
169.  See id. at *4. 
170.  Id. 
171.  Id. 
172.  Id. at *1–2, n.1 (quoting CON. GEN. STAT. § 19a-602(b)). 
173.  Id. at *2, *5. 
174.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2861, at *1–2, n.1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014) (quoting CON. GEN. STAT. § 19a-602(a)). 
175.  Id. at *1, *4. 
176.  Id. at *5. 
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performed the abortion on June 16, 2010.177  The plaintiffs alleged they were 
not provided the laboratory report, nor was the laboratory’s warning that 
discouraged irreversible action communicated to them.178 
     On June 16, 2010, the laboratory allegedly called the consulting physician 
and reported that it had experienced technical difficulties in the initial test, 
and the results of that test were not reliable.179 The physician immediately 
called the doctor that was to perform the abortion to communicate the news 
to the wife, but the abortion had already been performed.180 A final report 
issued by the laboratory on June 22 concluded there were no detectable 
chromosomal abnormalities, noting the first test was considered preliminary 
because of the risk of false positives.181 The plaintiffs alleged the consulting 
physician later advised them the pregnancy would likely have resulted in the 
birth of a healthy boy, had they not aborted the pregnancy.182 The couple filed 
a lawsuit in September 2012, but the suit was dismissed on procedural 
grounds in February 2013.183 The couple refiled the lawsuit the following 
June.184 
     In a largely unprecedented decision, the trial court allowed both the 
husband’s claim as well as the wife’s claim against the physicians to proceed, 
over the defendants’ objections as to the husband’s standing to sue.185 The 
state law, after all, vested the decision to undergo the abortion in the pregnant 
woman alone, and the physician had no professional duty to the husband.186 
																																																						
177.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2375, at *2–3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013).   
178.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2861, at *5–6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014). 
179.  Id.; Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2013 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 2375, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013).   
180.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2861, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014); Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. 
FSTCV136018746S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2375, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013).  
181.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2375, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013).  
182.  Id.  
183.  Meleny-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV126015461S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
266, at *5, *23 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2013).  
184.  See Superior Court Case Look-up, FST-CV13-6018746-S, Meleney-Distassio, Anne, 
Michael Distassio et al. v. Weinstein, MD, David et al., ST. OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, 
http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/CaseDetail/PublicCaseDetail.aspx?DocketNo=FSTCV13601874
6S.    
185.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2861, at *6–7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014). 
186.  Id. at *37–38; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-602(a) (2019). 
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The Court concluded, however, the husband’s claim was derivative of the 
physicians’ duty to the wife.187  
     The trial lasted five weeks.188 The defendants’ expert testified the initial test 
of the amniotic fluid was 99.99992% accurate, presumably if the proper 
protocols had been followed.189 In other words, the physicians reasonably 
relied on the initial test, despite it being considered preliminary and less 
accurate than the final test. On November 2, 2016, the jury deliberated for 
two hours before returning a verdict in favor of the defendants.190 
     The Author has no information indicating the physicians in the case were 
motivated by a desire to avoid legal liability or some other improper motives, 
or that they did anything that merited liability, but the case illustrates many 
of the concerns addressed above. First, the case shows a physician’s risk of 
being sued, and the adverse consequences even when the physician prevails 
in the case. The events underlying the suit occurred in June 2010. The initial 
suit was filed in September 2012. The jury pronounced its verdict in 
November 2016, a full six years after the incident and four years after the suit 
was initially filed. The trial alone lasted five weeks. The defendants’ names 
will forever be associated with this precedent-setting case, which, though 
unpublished, is available on such databases as Lexis and Westlaw. One can 
imagine the toll such litigation takes on a medical provider, and the reasons 
a medical provider would wish to avoid a lawsuit, regardless of its outcome.  
     Moreover, taking the verdict on its face, the suit did not arise because the 
providers did anything wrong, but rather because the circumstances made it 
appear that the providers may have done something wrong, with grave 
consequences. Had the plaintiffs established the providers’ liability, the 
verdict may have been substantial.191 This chance to recover substantial 
damages was likely an incentive to a plaintiffs’ attorney to prosecute the case, 
even though liability was far from certain. One can also imagine the emotions 
of the husband and wife that may have influenced them to pursue the suit. 
Assuming the allegations of fact in the suit are generally accurate, the 
plaintiffs had several prior unsuccessful attempts to bring a pregnancy to 
																																																						
187.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2861, at *37–38 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014).    
188.  NPM Advisory, supra note 161. 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. at 2; Defendant’s Verdict Form, http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/GetDocket.aspx 
(search in search bar for “FST-CV13-6018746-S”; then click on “Verdict for Defendant”) (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
191.  See supra note 129. But see Perry & Adar, supra note 137, at 544–47 (arguing that the 
damage awards for wrongful abortion would be relatively small in most jurisdictions). 
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term.192 They brought this pregnancy halfway to term only to receive a 
dreadful diagnosis that induced them to abort the pregnancy.193 Almost 
immediately after the abortion, they learned the information they trusted was 
potentially wrong, and within a week of the abortion, the diagnosis was 
reversed.194 A couple that experienced this could be strongly motivated to sue. 
     The case also presents a circumstance in which the parties are reasonably 
likely to have very different recollections of the key facts. The central question 
is what information was communicated to the woman about this test, the test 
results, and the actions she should take (if any) in light of the test results. 
Some information was likely communicated to her in conjunction with the 
ultrasound showing club feet, indicating this could be a sign of a fatal fetal 
diagnosis. The rest of the information may have been communicated to her 
shortly before the amniocentesis or in the telephone call regarding the test 
results. One can imagine the emotional state of the woman at these times. 
Likewise, given the fickleness of memory and the desire to avoid liability, it is 
plausible both the providers’ and the family’s accounts of the information 
communicated may be erroneous in part. 
     One easily sees in this scenario the difficult position of the physicians. 
They had what appeared to be a reliable, preliminary test result confirming 
their previous suspicions of a serious, incurable, and probably fatal, fetal 
anomaly. State law precluded abortion in such cases after fetal viability, 
which was imminent. They had to disclose the results. They had to discuss 
the option of abortion. They had to do so promptly, while abortion was still 
a legal option. They had to determine how to frame the discussion—what to 
disclose and how to present it. No matter what they might say, they were at 
risk of a lawsuit if the mother elected to bring the child to term. What makes 
this case extraordinary is that the physicians were sued despite the mother 
electing to terminate the pregnancy, because of the chance fact that the 
laboratory determined, despite the abortion, that the initial test result was 
erroneous.  
     This case certainly demonstrates the practical consequences of imperfect 
information. Assuming the test produces a false positive in only 8 of every 
10,000,000 instances, consistent with the claim the initial test was 99.99992% 
accurate, the likelihood that this positive test result was a false positive was at 
																																																						
192.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2861, at *3–4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014). 
193.  Id. at *4. 
194.  Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2375, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2013). 
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least 500 to 1—if the test procedures were properly followed.195 The available 
information does not disclose the “technical difficulties” that led the 
laboratory to conclude the June 15 report was unreliable, even prior to the 
laboratory completing the second test. The laboratory may have detected a 
human or equipment error. However, technical difficulties, human error, 
equipment errors, and failures of laboratory protocol are unavoidable risks 
that a physician could consider in presenting test results and his or her 
recommendations.196 Such risk could greatly reduce the reliability of the test 
result. 
     The presentation of this case in this manner, however, has a notable 
downside. This case apparently involved the abortion of a relatively healthy 
fetus based on an erroneous prenatal diagnosis. The attorneys for one of the 
physicians called the lab’s error “sad and shocking.”197 One might assume it 
was “sad” because a healthy fetus was aborted on a mistaken diagnosis. The 
corollary might be that it would not be “sad” if the fetus in fact had the 
Trisomy 18 syndrome. This line of reasoning, however, may judge any fetus 
with the Trisomy 18 syndrome as more worthy of being aborted than a 
healthy fetus. As discussed below, such eugenic and discriminatory social 
attitudes demean all those living with the Trisomy 18 syndrome. As such, it 
is important to note that abortion in such instances is still elective abortion. 
The option to continue the pregnancy should not be discounted. While 
miscarriages or stillbirths are common as affected pregnancies progress, 
many children with Trisomy 18 are born alive.198 Depending in part on the 
																																																						
195.  This calculation presumes that the odds of a pregnancy being afflicted by a Trisomy 
18 defect is 1 in 2,500, consistent with the available data. Cereda & Carey, supra note 163, at 2. 
If so, then 10,000,000 tests would produce approximately 4,000 true positives and 8 false 
positives, or about 500 true positives for every false positive. That being said, factors such as 
the mother’s age affect the likelihood that the particular pregnancy is afflicted by a Trisomy 
18, affecting this calculation. Id. Moreover, the detection of clubfeet in the ultrasound 
increased the probability that this pregnancy was a risk for a Trisomy 18 defect, as compared 
to a random sample population. Thus, while a positive test result may be erroneous in 
approximately 1 of 500 cases based on a random sampling, the doctors had to consider the 
additional information they had in assessing whether it was likely that this positive result was 
a false positive. Unless most pregnancies tested using this method had similar indicators that 
the condition was present, the evidence of the clubfeet could greatly increase the odds that this 
was a true positive—so long as the test procedures had been followed. It is not uncommon, 
however, for attorneys to mislead juries, or be misled themselves, through flawed probabilistic 
logic.  
196.  E.g., Zadrozny, supra note 110 (allegation that human error caused an erroneous 
diagnosis of an intersex fetus). 
197.  NPM Advisory, supra note 161. 
198.  Cereda & Carey, supra note 163, at 3. 
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gravity of the child’s physical condition, a family may elect anything from 
palliative care to extraordinary interventions.199 In some cases where the 
child’s condition is incompatible with prolonged life, the family may accept 
that fact and spend what little time they have with the infant without medical 
intervention, or with limited medical intervention.200 Sixty to seventy-five 
percent of the infants born alive with Trisomy 18 syndrome survive the first 
twenty-four hours; forty to sixty percent survive a week; twenty-two to forty-
four percent live at least six months; and five to ten percent celebrate their 
first birthday.201 An article by Anna Cereda and John C. Carey briefly 
highlights with images three instances of individuals with the Trisomy 18 
syndrome: a two-year-old boy who was “quite stable medically, gaining 
weight, sitting up, and participating in the many activities of his family”; a 
sixteen-year-old girl who was “very healthy” whose “favorite pastime” was 
feeding herself, and who walked with assistance and could climb stairs on her 
own; and a young lady who, despite having “full [T]risomy 18 in early 
childhood and in adolescence,” lived to nineteen years old “and achieved 
multiple milestones, including sitting and walking in a walker.”202 Simply put, 
even in the case of a Trisomy 18 defect, the family can elect to try to continue 
the pregnancy to term, to build a relationship with the child, to love the child 
and accept the child regardless of the child’s chromosomal condition.203 
Indeed, in some cases, the child may survive to return the love. Put another 
way, there is still room for hope. 
IV. THE SOCIAL AND MORAL COSTS OF THIS ARRANGEMENT 
     From a strictly utilitarian perspective, social harms stemming from 
encouraging the abortion of children with special needs are not particularly 
obvious. Detecting serious medical conditions in utero and avoiding the 
economic and social costs attending those cases seems to be a social good.204 
Likewise, many families would experience extreme financial and emotional 
																																																						
199.  Id. at 5–7. 
200.  See Igniter Media, 99 Balloons, YOUTUBE (Apr. 3, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/ 
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difficulties in caring for a child with serious special needs.205 Autonomy and 
self-determination in such reproductive decisions are typically proffered as a 
social good.206 Some suggest that the child, at least in some cases, has a right 
to be aborted—that a life with disabilities, or with severe disabilities, is not 
worth living.207 This Part, however, presents several reasons why our 
medicolegal system should not encourage the abortion of special needs 
children as it does.  
     First, a system that incentivizes a doctor’s distortion of the truth in 
communicating with a patient to mitigate the risk of personal or professional 
harm to the doctor should strike any person of integrity as a social evil.208 
This is not to portray medical providers as lacking moral fiber; the system is 
dysfunctional.  
     Second, even assuming abortion is a morally neutral act, our society 
typically regards free and informed choice as a positive good.209 Systemic 
incentives for a medical provider to persuade a mother to choose abortion 
infringe on the woman’s ability to make a free and informed choice.210 
Pressure for a prompt decision prior to an adjustment to the new, adverse 
reality obstructs free choice.211 A prognosis that emphasizes the worst-case 
scenario, rather than the range of probable scenarios, may undermine an 
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supra note 90, at 87. 
209.  See Curran, supra note 10, at 135–38; cf. Belsky, supra note 44, at 267–68 (arguing 
that the right to abort a child diagnosed as potentially having special needs “should be 
respected by the medical provider as the decision of both parents and child, and accorded legal 
protection through pecuniary sanction”). 
210.  See Dixon, supra note 10, at 46–50, 53–54; Hensel, supra note 7, at 191; Diehr, supra 
note 4, at 1301–02, 1307–08. 
211.  Buck, supra note 31, at 918–19; Dixon, supra note 10, at 4, 39–40. 
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informed choice.212 A decision made in emotional or physical isolation from 
other personal, medical, or spiritual advisors is not always a free or informed 
choice.213 While many of these scenarios may not give rise to a legally 
enforceable right of action against the medical provider, they are still 
objectionable on moral or ethical grounds.214 
     Related to this point, psychology and behavioral economics studies 
indicate that we tend to perform poorly in tasks of affective forecasting—
evaluating our ability to cope with or to adjust to adverse developments in 
our lives.215 We tend to overestimate the duration and severity of negative 
emotions associated with foreseen persistent adversities.216 This seems to 
arise from three interacting cognitive biases: focalism, which is the tendency, 
when evaluating an anticipated change, to focus more on what will change 
with the foreseen adversity than on what will stay the same; immune neglect, 
which is the failure to envision the effect of one’s own coping skills; and the 
failure to predict adaptation, whereby personal values evolve with changes in 
circumstances.217 A prognosis emphasizing the worst-case scenario likely has 
a disproportionate impact on a person’s decision-making with respect to his 
or her estimation of long-term happiness.218 Imagining the worst-case 
scenario can increase focalism and the immune neglect and inhibit imagining 
adaptions.219 Emotional disturbances can increase the effect of these cognitive 
biases.220 Drs. Jodi Halpern and Robert M. Arnold explain: 
[F]ear can rivet attention on the most frightening aspects of 
a situation . . . or convince a person that a possible threat is 
inevitable. Distress can block memories of better times, 
limiting one’s ability to form more hopeful beliefs about the 
future. Patients who are afraid and upset project these 
intense feelings onto the future, and anxiety can undermine 
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the reflectiveness needed to recognize such projections and 
address them.221 
It appears this is true for women that experience adverse prenatal diagnoses. 
While distress is high following the discovery of the fetal anomaly, the 
distress tends to decline to near normal levels by the time the pregnancy 
reaches full term for those that continue the pregnancy.222 
     Third, abortion in such circumstances has well-documented adverse 
psychological risks that should be fairly disclosed by the provider 
recommending the abortion.223 The risks include a sense of guilt, distress, and 
damaged relationships.224 Moreover, one study showed that of women who 
elected to terminate a pregnancy due to an adverse prenatal diagnosis, forty-
six percent were experiencing pathological levels of post-traumatic stress and 
twenty-eight percent were experiencing depression four months after the 
termination.225 The symptoms continued for another year for nearly half of 
the affected women.226 Predictors of these adverse psychological 
consequences included self-efficacy, high level of doubt during decision-
making, lack of partner support, religious beliefs, and advanced gestational 
age.227 Granted, women who choose to continue a pregnancy despite an 
adverse prenatal diagnosis may also experience depression and distress, but 
as noted above, the distress tends to decline to near normal levels by the time 
the pregnancy reaches full term, as compared to pregnant women without 
adverse prenatal diagnoses.228 While some of the adverse psychological effects 
of termination are likely the result of the social stigma concerning abortion,229 
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229.  See France et al., supra note 150, at 25, 27, 29–30; Franz Hanschmidt et al., Stigma in 
the Context of Pregnancy Termination After Diagnosis of Fetal Anomaly: Associations with 
Grief, Trauma, and Depression, 21 ARCHIVES OF WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH 391 (2018). 
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that is probably not the primary cause.230 Even still, these adverse 
psychological risks ought to be considered in evaluating the current practices 
and system.  
     Fourth, abortion and policies promoting abortion in cases of poor prenatal 
diagnoses likely contribute to the marginalization of people with special 
needs in our society.231 Each person with special needs in our society will 
interact with or encounter a large number of people, and abortions that 
eliminate people with special needs reduce the frequency and diversity of 
those interactions.232 This presumably contributes to our society’s general 
evaluation of what constitutes “normal,” “appropriate,” “necessary,” and 
“good” to the disadvantage of those with special needs. These evaluations 
affect public policy, public or private accommodations, medical treatment, 
and public or private personal behavior.233 For instance, if disabilities are 
viewed predominantly to be a product of age or tragedy, a young person with 
special needs will more often be viewed as embodying a tragedy, rather than 
being viewed as a person that engages the world on different terms.234 These 
attitudes can have perverse effects on social expectations concerning those 
with special needs and their role in our shared society.235 They may also 
																																																						
230.  See generally Korenromp, supra note 135. A collection of studies from the 
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232.  Cf. Diehr, supra note 4, at 1309 (“One side effect of the drastically increased number 
of fetuses with disabilities being aborted would be the necessarily decreased pool of peers for 
persons born with disabilities.”). 
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accept the birth of avoidably impaired children.”); Hensel, supra note 7, at 147–48. 
234.  See Hensel, supra note 7, at 185. 
235.  Diehr, supra note 4, at 1302, 1308–10; see also Frati et al., supra note 4, at 340 (“In 
today’s society, there is a widespread feeling that it is not life that should be protected at all 
costs, but the quality of life.”). 
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impact an expectant parent’s willingness to bring a handicapped person into 
the world.236 
     Judging people by their disabilities and conditions—or, perhaps more 
euphemistically, their quality of life—demeans both their abilities and their 
subjectivity.237 It demeans their status as a human person. It demeans the 
status of all who share the condition. Aborting children in utero because of 
their condition can be viewed as the moral equivalent of, if not a definite and 
perverse form of, discrimination on the basis of disability.238 As many authors 
have pointed out, wrongful birth and wrongful life lawsuits, which allow a 
parent or a disabled person to sue a doctor for compensation due to a 
disability the doctor did not cause, demean all who share the condition at 
issue. These suits send a public message that abortion—terminating the 
child’s existence—is an appropriate course of care for the disability.239 This 
contributes to a general, biased perspective that a person with a disability is 
less than a normal person, rather than a person who engages the world on 
different terms.240 This is contrary to the values implicit in our social 
restraints on discrimination and the constitutional command for equal 
protection of the laws, even though the value is not extended in law to the 
protection of unborn children with special needs.241 
     The experiences of a person with disabilities, especially one with 
disabilities from birth, cannot easily be evaluated by a person without 
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disabilities.242 Not only are the struggles misunderstood, but the joys are also 
misapprehended.243 A passage from Harlan Hahn is well worth quoting: 
[D]isabled persons do not experience the external 
environment in the same way as the nondisabled. The focus 
of attention is different; the concentration of energy is 
different; the impressions formed in personal interactions 
are different . . . . [M]any of their viewpoints might 
encompass both positive aspects of everyday life that the 
nondisabled tend to take for granted—the sensuous touch of 
a sheet on the skin, the exhilaration of simply moving from 
here to there, the joy of communicating with a world that 
once seemed dark or silent.244 
Much the same can be said of parenting a child with special needs. As a father 
of a daughter whose congenital brain malformation in the area of her speech 
cortex leaves her largely unable to process words, it is remarkable to see her 
response to music. What must it be like, in this cynical age, to have a brain 
shaped by music rather than language? The struggles and joys of raising a 
child with special needs are grossly misunderstood by most who have not 
shared the experience. 
     Fifth, the challenge of caring for and improving the lives of those with 
special needs will advance the science of medicine.245 When abortion is an 
acceptable and encouraged option, there is less pressure to develop more 
accurate diagnostic methods and better treatments. The abortion of children 
with special needs also represents the loss of information about the prognosis 
of people with such conditions. While one might justly recoil from the idea 
of treating a person with special needs as simply a source of medical data, one 
cannot deny that the battle to treat people with special needs may advance 
the science of medicine, to the benefit of many. 
     Sixth, each person with special needs may contribute to society in 
ordinary, special, or even exceptional ways. While those with special needs 
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may require a large amount of care, economic resources, and attention, these 
costs are incommensurate as compared to even the simple joys that may 
come with knowing a person with special needs.246 This is not intended to 
minimize the difficulty, burden, or cost of caring for a person with special 
needs, but there is no currency that allows for an objective measurement of 
the economic costs as compared to the intangible benefits of such an 
interaction.  
     Finally, embracing the challenge of caring for each person with special 
needs also affirms the intrinsic value of each person, a value that is not based 
on what the person contributes or does.247 Caring for those with special needs 
provides the caregivers an opportunity to learn to love another—to seek the 
other’s good—without regard to the personal return. This capacity and 
opportunity for altruism is a social good.248 
     In short, the current system, which incentivizes providers to recommend 
or even promote abortion in cases of adverse fetal diagnoses, is at odds with 
several values our society rightly prioritizes. These include integrity, free and 
informed choice, nondiscrimination, respect for the experience of others, 
equal protection under the law, scientific advancement, and social altruism. 
With this in mind, we will turn to potential solutions. 
V. POSSIBLE REMEDIES 
     If the current interplay between law and medicine is negatively impacting 
society by incentivizing the abortion of children in utero with poor prenatal 
diagnoses, what can be done to alter that situation? There is no obvious 
solution, but this final Part surveys some options. 
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     Advocates of abortion rights will correctly note that part of the problem 
arises from restrictions on late-term, nontherapeutic abortions.249 As noted 
above, if a poor prenatal diagnosis is made twenty-two weeks into the 
pregnancy, and the state prohibits nontherapeutic abortions after twenty-
four weeks, the law is an external pressure for a prompt decision. 
Adjustments could be made to these laws to allow greater freedom to make 
an informed decision without the pressures of time. This would not address 
the entire problem, but it would address at least one part of the problem. 
     Opponents of abortion would likely advocate for greater legal restrictions 
on abortion. These restrictions may include prohibiting abortions targeting 
fetal anomalies, instituting mandatory waiting periods for abortions, and 
establishing mandatory disclosures of information prior to providing an 
abortion. It may include these and other methods to reduce the isolation the 
woman feels, the pressures on her for a prompt decision, or the risk that the 
provider will deliver incomplete or inaccurate information.250 Each of these 
proposals may have merit, if viewed objectively, but they would restrain 
abortion and will be opposed by many on that basis alone.251 They may also 
interfere, to some degree, in the doctor-patient communications, making 
them vulnerable to social criticism and prone to constitutional challenges.252 
     If mandating disclosure of information is socially or politically 
unacceptable, disclosures might still be encouraged. For instance, the federal 
Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act,253 enacted 
in 2008, authorized “the awarding of grants, contracts or cooperative 
agreements” to entities to “collect, synthesize, and disseminate current 
evidence-based information relating to Down syndrome or other prenatally 
or postnatally diagnosed conditions” and to “coordinate the provision of, and 
access to, new or existing supportive services for patients receiving a positive 
diagnosis for Down syndrome or other prenatally or postnatally diagnosed 
conditions.”254 
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     One might consider tort reform options.255 On one extreme, the causes of 
action for wrongful birth and wrongful life could be abolished, eliminating 
much of the concern of legal liability. Disability rights advocates may favor 
this approach, as wrongful life and wrongful birth reinforce the public 
perception that nonexistence is preferable to living with special needs.256 One 
author argues that permitting such suits violates the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.257 Abolishing such claims, however, may infringe on other 
social values.258 In addition to the remedial, punitive, and deterrent functions 
served generally by civil suits against medical providers, discussed in Part I, 
suits in cases involving poor prenatal diagnoses or children born with special 
needs help to preserve the social values associated with the mother’s right to 
choose abortion or to choose to continue the pregnancy.259 A medical 
provider who intentionally or negligently fails to discover or to disclose 
information pertinent to the decision whether or not to abort the pregnancy 
may be accused of infringing the rights of the patient or substituting his 
judgment for hers.260 In fact, statutes prohibiting wrongful birth and 
wrongful life lawsuits have been challenged, so far unsuccessfully, as 
unconstitutional restraints on abortion.261 Tort reform options short of 
abolishing the causes of action, such as damage limitations or procedural 
hurdles in pursuing such suits, will likely affect the number of suits, but may 
not impact the specter of such suits that drives the practice of defensive 
medicine.262 Perhaps more creative solutions, such as a right of the parents, 
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on their own behalf and on the child’s behalf, to waive any right to sue for 
wrongful birth or wrongful life, might have some value.263  
     An alternative to making suits impossible or more difficult would be to 
make suits easier.264 The central concern disclosed in this analysis is that 
medical providers can offer incomplete or inaccurate information to 
persuade a woman to choose abortion, because the abortion would decrease 
the provider’s risk of a lawsuit. Facilitating lawsuits in cases where the 
provider presents incomplete or inaccurate information could restore 
balance in the providers’ risk calculus.265 In theory, one might use existing 
tort claims in this situation. As illustrated in Part III, “wrongful abortion” 
claims have been tested in a few jurisdictions. In many jurisdictions, however, 
an abortion performed competently may not be considered an injury, even if 
the woman’s consent to the procedure was based on inadequate 
disclosures.266 Moreover, in the leading article exploring wrongful abortion 
based on negligence, Professors Ronen Perry and Yehuda Adar argue that 
traditional tort rules do not adequately address all of the social harms arising 
from wrongful abortion.267 The relatively low damage award would still leave 
an incentive for providers to err on the side of recommending abortion, and 
the difficulty of detecting the negligence diminishes the systemic 
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effectiveness of this remedy.268 One might also consider a fraud-based claim, 
but these claims will have similar limitations.269  
     A state might better address this scenario, therefore, by expressly 
authorizing suit if a doctor communicates incomplete or inaccurate 
information that influences a person to consent to an abortion.270 This 
solution does not restrain abortions per se, and it does not unreasonably 
restrain doctor-patient communications. It merely requires truthful 
communications, whatever the truth may be. States could tailor this concept 
by prohibiting, for instance, only the communication of knowingly false 
information, or false information with the intent to persuade a person to 
choose an abortion, or inaccurate information likely to influence the decision 
of a reasonably prudent patient, or information a reasonably skilled physician 
would know to be erroneous.271 States could determine who has the right to 
bring the suit: the mother, a representative of the deceased child, the father, 
or a combination of these. Either the legislature or the judiciary would have 
to determine what constitutes legally cognizable damages in such cases: 
physical pain, emotional distress, the cost of medical care, or the loss of 
companionship, to name a few possible categories.272 One option would be to 
establish a right to recover attorney fees, expert fees, and costs together with 
a specified amount, or with the greater of the actual damages or a specified 
amount. This last approach may help disconnect the sanction from the 
outcome and attach the sanctions to bad behavior, but the award of attorney 
fees may provide too great of an incentive to plaintiffs’ attorneys in marginal 
cases. Professors Perry and Adar argue for a similar solution, namely a 
discretionary civil fine to be appended to civil lawsuits that successfully prove 
a wrongful abortion.273 
     Professional sanctions for providing false information to encourage the 
abortion of children with special needs may also be feasible,274 but they would 
be subject to the politics and limited resources of medical boards and 
disciplinary panels.275 Criminal prohibitions may only increase the practice 
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of defensive medicine.276 They also would not likely be useful, except in a 
symbolic sense, because prosecutors would be reluctant to pursue criminal 
charges against a doctor for communications with a patient.277 Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys do not have the same reservations. Criminal statutes and 
professional sanctions may also be subject to First Amendment scrutiny and 
may be perceived as an unreasonable restraint on the right to abortion, even 
though they would operate indirectly at best.278 They would likely have to be 
more narrowly tailored than civil remedies.279 
     Another option would involve social security programs or other 
government programs that reduce the burden of caring for children with 
special needs.280 W. Ryan Schuster, for instance, suggests that no-fault based 
programs similar to the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury 
Compensation Program and the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury 
Compensation Association can serve as a valuable substitute for prenatal 
negligence lawsuits.281 Any such program must be judged on its merits, using 
the dictates of reason and prudence. There often are, however, substantial 
practical barriers to accessing the resources that are available.282 Parents 
raising a child with special needs face a steep learning curve to understand 
Medicaid and other programs that are intended to assist them, not to 
mention the difficulty of maneuvering through the bureaucracy. Assistance 
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programs, however, that are generally accessible to all those with 
disabilities—or all those with disabilities in financial need, perhaps—are 
preferable to large judgment payouts directed to the relatively few successful 
litigants, payouts influenced by chance events, cheapened by deductions for 
attorney fees and costs, and secured by litigating in a tax-subsidized court 
system.283 The preconditions for assistance through social programs would 
be the existence of a disability and perhaps financial need, whereas the 
preconditions for a judgment payout would be a disability, a doctor’s 
apparent negligence, a good lawyer, some persuasive expert witnesses, 
testimony that the disabled person would have been aborted had the mother 
known better, and some good luck.284  
     There are also abundant non-legal options for addressing the situation. 
There are often community support groups or similar resources available for 
those facing difficult pregnancies or raising children with special needs.285 
These resources can be promoted to remedy the isolation and uncertainty 
one would reasonably feel in facing a poor prenatal diagnosis. Hospitals can 
also expand perinatal bereavement and palliative care, parental education, 
and similar support options, as well as supporting nondirective counseling 
and being more proactive in preparing an expectant mother and her family 
for difficult decisions.286 Joan G. Lalor et al. provide several practical tips for 
medical providers, including facilitating immediate, or at least prompt, 
communications between the provider and the mother about the nature of 
the anomaly detected; providing the family supplemental written materials, 
or directing the family to reliable online information; using images to explain 
the condition; connecting the families to a fetal medicine specialist promptly, 
preferably within twenty-four hours; avoiding jargon in communicating 
about the anomaly; connecting the family to a midwife with experience in 
adverse prenatal conditions; allowing communications with medical 
providers between appointments; not excluding the woman’s partner from 
discussions; and arranging for continuity of the caregiver.287 Aligning 
patients with doctors that share similar moral values would also allow for 
greater trust and decrease the potential pressures that come with adverse 
prenatal diagnoses. This may be difficult or impossible, especially where 
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there is a need for specialists, but it is an avenue to consider. Also, clear 
communication in the doctor-patient relationship about the patient’s values, 
and attention to these values by the provider, would typically benefit all the 
parties.  
     In dialoguing directly with those facing a poor prenatal diagnosis for their 
child, whether as a medical provider, a family member, a counselor, or a 
friend, false pessimism is no better than false optimism, and potentially much 
worse in the decision-making process, due to poor affective forecasting and 
emotional vulnerability.288 It is important to be realistic about the range and 
probability of possible outcomes, and what is known and unknown about the 
condition, the prognosis, and the treatment options. Moreover, parents who 
intended to bring the child to term should be allowed as much time as can be 
afforded to adjust to the new reality before making a decision. They should 
be made aware of the highs and lows that come with raising a child with 
special needs and the range of experiences one will encounter, like fear and 
powerlessness as your child is wheeled into an overnight emergency surgery, 
to the joy of a smile when your child hears Patti Page sing “How Much Is 
That Doggie in the Window.”  
     Drs. Jodi Halpern and Robert M. Arnold offer several practical tips to 
address the cognitive biases and emotions that lead to poor affective 
forecasting in medical decisions—that is, the tendency to estimate one’s 
future happiness as more severely impaired by a foreseen medical adversity 
than it actually will be.289 To address the bias of focalism, Halpern and Arnold 
recommend identifying the person’s point of focus, have the person describe 
all the similar types of things in that category, and then help the person 
identify those things in the category that will not (or may not) be impaired.290 
To take an extreme case, for a family with a child who is expected to die 
shortly after birth, the parents are likely to focus on the child’s suffering and 
the future the child will not have. One can help the family refocus on the life, 
short as it may be, that the child may have with a loving family, experiencing 
the physical touch, loving words, and warm embrace of family. To address 
immune neglect—the tendency to discount one’s coping mechanisms—a 
counselor can ask what has helped the person through past adversities, 
reminding the person of his or her conscious coping mechanism, such as 
humor, compartmentalization, intellectualization, and sublimation.291 
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Cognitive behavioral therapy may also help.292 To help the family members 
recognize their ability to adapt to adversity through adoption of new values, 
support groups, anecdotes of similarly situated families, and interactive 
decision aids with narratives may help.293 To address the emotional distress, 
Halpern and Arnold suggest empathetic listening, cognitive reframing, 
gathering social supports, and encouraging peer support groups.294 They also 
emphasize the need to break down social stigmas related to disabilities.295 
     Social dialogue about poor prenatal diagnoses may also help curb the 
pressure families may experience.296 Even those who oppose abortion in 
principle may find it difficult to decline an abortion when they face an 
unexpected poor prenatal diagnosis. In a state of extreme emotional 
disturbance, the rational reasons for rejecting abortion are easily 
overwhelmed by anxiety, uncertainty, disappointment, and fear. Those who 
oppose abortion in such cases would do well, therefore, to address this reality 
in their social communications rather than speaking to the issue only when 
there is a particular need. A parent’s strong emotional response to 
devastating news cannot easily be subordinated to reason in the moment. It 
can be subordinated, however, if the person holds a competing value dearly, 
such as a value connected, in the person’s mind, to the person’s self-identity 
or the person’s sense of relationship. In other words, the negative emotional 
response of fear, distress, and uncertainty is best tamed not by reason, but by 
a stronger emotional adherence to a competing value. It may not be enough 
to believe in the abstract that abortion is wrong, for instance; one must have 
a strong emotional response against the idea that I would ever abort my child. 
Teaching others to feel the value of every life, and in particular the value of 
those with special needs, is a worthy goal too often ignored by those who 
oppose abortion in the face of an adverse prenatal diagnosis. 
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